Мусульманские армии Средних веков

30 posts in this topic

Hugh Kennedy. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century. 1986


The fall of the Umayyads can be explained in many ways. At an ideological level, they failed because they could not offer the sort of leadership which many Muslims wanted. It used to be accepted that the Umayyads claimed only secular authority but recent work by Crone and Hinds has demonstrated that the Umayyad caliphs did claim a religious authority; the ruler was God’s Caliph and had the authority to make decisions about Islamic law and practice. However, there were many Muslims, especially in Iraq, who felt that charismatic, truly Islamic leadership was necessary to establish the rule of the Qur’an and Sunna. By the end of the Umayyad period it had become an article of faith among such people that only the Family of the Prophet could supply this authority.

There were also regional problems. From ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign onwards, Umayyad government had increasingly meant Syrian government. Despite attempts by ‘Umar II and others to broaden the base of the regime, the Muslims of Iraq were entirely excluded. This narrowness of support became even more pronounced with the Qaysc triumph under Marwan II; at the end even Syria and Palestine were conquered territories and Damascus had been replaced by Harran in the Jazcra as the Umayyad capital. This restricted nature of support for the regime was made more serious because neither Syria nor the Jazcra was as rich, or had such large Muslim populations as Iraq. In the second eighth century, the revenues from the alluvial areas of southern Iraq amounted to four times those from Egypt and almost five times the revenues from the whole of Syria and Palestine. Constant warfare had certainly drained the resources of manpower in Syria. The wars of Hisham’s reign against the Berbers and the internecine disputes which followed his death must have placed a considerable strain on the manpower of the Qaysc tribes who supported the last Umayyad. In addition, Marwan’s policies had spread disaffection, not just among elements traditionally hostile to the regime but among people who had previously been loyal servants, like the family of Khalid al-Qasrc and even members of the Umayyad house itself, like Hisham’s own son Sulayman. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Umayyad state was swept away.

In the final judgement, however, it would be wrong to imagine that the fall of the dynasty was inevitable. The Umayyad regime had never been as strong as it had been under Hisham only a decade before the final collapse. It was only the failure of leadership and murderous conflicts which followed his death which led to disaster and even at the end Marwan’s Qaysc supporters could raise very formidable armies to oppose the ‘Abbasids.


Share this post

Link to post
Share on other sites

Hugh Kennedy. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century. 1986


The eastern frontiersmen of Khurasan defeated the men from the Byzantine frontier who supported Marwan but this did not automatically mean the triumph of the ‘Abbasid dynasty. The armies were directed by Abe Muslim and led by Khurasancs who had in many cases no direct contact with the ‘Abbasid family at all; none of the ‘Abbasids had participated in the long march across Iran and the fierce battles against the Umayyad armies of Nubata b. Hanzala and ‘Amir b. Dubara.


The proclamation of al-Saffaq as caliph and his acceptance by the Khurasancs and the Kufans only marked the beginning of the establishment of the ‘Abbasids. A number of questions remained to be decided notably whether the ‘Abbasids were to be powerful sovereigns in the way that the Umayyads had been or simply symbolic rulers who would give legitimacy to Khurasanc military rule, and the nature of the relationship between the Khurasanc army and other elements in the Muslim community; in other words would the military dictatorship of the Qayscs simply be replaced by that of the Khurasancs. When al-Saffaq was acknowledged as caliph the answers to these questions were very uncertain and it would be hard to exaggerate the precariousness of the position of the new dynasty. That ‘Abbasid rule was established and accepted by most of the Muslim community was the achievement of the remarkable group of men who formed al-Saffaq’s immediate family and particularly of his own brother Abu Ja‘far, later the Caliph al-Mansur. Al-Saffaq himself only reigned for four years (132–6/749–54) but this period saw the establishment of ‘Abbasid power as it was to remain until after the death of Harun al-Rashid. The caliph himself is sometimes portrayed as a rather nondescript character, even a weakling, and Shaban has argued that he was chosen by the Khurasancs precisely because he was not likely to assert himself. But the historical record suggests a man who was at once cautious and determined and the establishment of the ‘Abbasids owed much to his low-key leadership in the early years.

The key to ‘Abbasid success was to leave eastern Iran in the hands of the Khurasaniyya (the men from Khurasan who had made up the ‘Abbasid army) and Abu Muslim, while establishing members of the ‘Abbasid family as commanders of armies and governors of provinces in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula. As soon as al-Saffaq becamecaliph he sent his uncle ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Alc to lead the armies opposing Marwan on the river Zab, while his brother Abu Ja‘far went to take command of the army besieging the last Umayyad governor of Iraq, Yazcd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra in Wasis. Both ‘Abd Allah and Abu Ja‘far thus acquired a following among the Khurasaniyya in the armies who came to associate their interests with those of their ‘Abbasid leaders. But both men also realized that to rely exclusively on the Khurasaniyya was a recipe for disaster, it would mean that they were little more than puppets in the hands of the military leaders and that they would incur the lasting hostility of all the other groups in the western half of the Islamic world. It would be, in fact, a denial of all the objectives of the revolution. Among the other groups they turned to were of course the Arabs of the Yamami party who had opposed Marwan II. The most famous of these were the Muhallabc family whose influence had survived the fall of Yazcd b. al-Muhallab from political power and who had attempted to take their home town of Basra for the ‘Abbasids at the time of the revolution. The family was now rewarded by governorships, in Basra itself and other areas, notably Ifrcqiya, and they enjoyed a new golden age of prosperity. Also rewarded was the family of another leading figure of the Yamami opposition, Hisham’s long-serving governor of the east, Khalid b. ‘Abd Allah al-Qasri, whose son Muqammad had brought over the town of Kefa to the ‘Abbasid cause and was now rewarded with government appointments, although his family never achieved the eminence of the Muhallabcs.

More striking is the efforts the early ‘Abbasids made to win over the leaders of the Qays. Abu Ja‘far seems to have attempted a compromise with the arch-Qaysc Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra, but was thwarted by Abu Muslim who instructed al-Saffaq to have Yazid executed. Both ‘Abd Allah and Abu Ja‘far did, however, win over many of the Qayscs of the Byzantine and Armenian frontier lands, notably Marwan’s righthand man in the area, Isqaq b. Muslim al-‘Uqaylc, who was to become part of al-Mansur’s inner circle of advisers. Another Qaysc family which survived to enjoy honour and power were the descendants of Qutayba b. Muslim, the conqueror of Bukhara and Samarqand, whose associations with the Umayyad cause did not prevent them being recruited to the ‘Abbasids. One group alone was excluded from this general reconciliation, the members of the Umayyad family itself. All the prominent Umayyads were hunted down and many of them executed by ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Alc when he took over Syria, only one, ‘Abd al-Raqman b. Mu‘awiya, a grandson of the Caliph Hisham, escaping to join supporters in Muslim Spain where he founded a long-lived and successful branch of the dynasty at the western end of the Islamic world.


С другой стороны - в конце 820-х частной армии Абу Ишака аль-Мутасима из 3-4 тысяч тюрок окажется достаточно, чтобы прогнуть халифат под себя... =/


Al-Mu‘tasim was in many ways a new man himself; one of Harun’s younger sons, he had been given no place in the elaborate succession arrangements his father had worked out and he was only fifteen years old at the outbreak of the civil war. 


From 199/814–15 he began to buy slaves in Baghdad from their previous owners and to train them for military service, and both Itakh, a Khazar who had been a cook for his previous owner, and Ashinas were in his service before 202/817–18. He also entered into an arrangement with the Samanid family who controlled much of the Samarqand area and sent him slaves directly from Turkestan. The private army he built up probably only numbered 3,000–4,000 by the end of al-Ma’mun’s reign but they were well trained and disciplined and formed a formidable fighting force.


When in 213/828 ‘Abd Allah b. Tahir was appointed governor of Khurasan on the death of his brother
Talqa, al-Mu‘tasim took over all his responsibilities in Syria and Egypt, thus becoming one of the most powerful men in the caliphate. It was this military power, coupled with al-Mu‘tasim’s own forceful and determined personality which induced al-Ma’mun to set aside the claims of his own son al-‘Abbas and to adopt al-Mu‘tasim as his heir. When al-Ma’mun died in 218/833 during a campaign against the Byzantines, his brother was accepted as caliph, not without some murmurings of dissent from those who saw clearly what the new regime would bring.

The new order was based firmly on the army al-Mu‘tasim had built up.


В указанный период Багдад (ошметки абна) и Большой Хорасан контролировали Тахириды, одна из опор режима. Потеряют контроль над Хорасаном они как раз в период "Анархии в Самарре" и после нее.


It is important to remember, too, that the Tahirids were as powerful in Baghdad as in Khurasan itself and it is probable that the revenues of Khurasan were used to maintain the family’s influence in that city. When ‘Abd Allah b. Tahir had left to take up his position in Khurasan in 213/828 he was succeeded in Baghdad by his cousin Isqaq b. Ibrahim who remained effective ruler of the city until his death over twenty years later in 235/850 after which he was followed by other members of the family. It was this Tahirid control which secured the loyalty of the Baghdadis to the caliphate, especially after al-Mu‘tarim had moved the capital to Samarra, and it was the Tahirids who suppressed the only real disturbance in the city during these years, the conspiracy of Aqmad b. Nasr al-Khuza‘i in 231/846. One of the main reasons for the civil war had been the desire of the abna under ‘Ali b. ‘Isa to have access to the tax revenues of Khurasan; now, under Tahirid patronage, their children had just that. Baghdad could prove useful to the caliphs as a rival source of power to Samarra with its Turkish population; when al-Mutawakkil wished to dispose of the Turk Itakh in 235/849 he arranged that the execution should be carried out by the Tahirids in Baghdad, safely away from Itakh’s followers in Samarra.



By 335/946 the three sons of Buya had established themselves in effective control of Fars, Iraq and Rayy, and their descendants were able to maintain themselves in most of those areas until the coming of the Seljuks, a century later. The history of the Buyid period is very confused and full of marches, battles and succession disputes which seem both ephemeral and pointless. The historian’s task is complicated by the fact that there were at least three and sometimes more centres of activity which were at the same time closely interconnected. This means that the narrative thread is thoroughly tangled and the position is made more difficult by the fact that the sources are very uneven. It is clear that Fars was the most important province of the Buyid confederation but the narratives on which we depend are largely based on Baghdad material and show almost no concern for events in Fars at all, while on the other hand we are very well informed about Iraqi affairs which were in some ways marginal to Buyid history. None the less, events in Baghdad are of great interest for social and cultural reasons, since it was in Baghdad at this time that the doctrinal positions of imami Shi‘ism and Sunnc Islam were worked out. Baghdad then, attracts more attention than its purely political importance would warrant.

Buyid history can be chronologically divided, roughly, into two divisions. The first half-century, up to the death of ‘Adud al-Dawla, greatest of the Buyid rulers, in 372/983, is one of growth and consolidation when the political initiative was firmly in the hands of the princes of the ruling dynasty. From that point, however, the Buyids were on the defensive, especially in Iraq and central Iran, and political initiative passed to the hands of groups of soldiers and administrators who strove to manipulate their nominal rulers in their own interests.

Опять "великая держава одного четырех двух человек". Али ибн Буя Имад аль-Даула с двумя братьями создал державу ("конфедерацию") Буидов, воспользовавшись прогрессирующим кризисом Аббасидов. Его племянник Хосров (!) Адуд аль-Даула - пик силы Буидов. И все. 

С другой стороны - "золотой век" Омейядов-Марванидов и Аббасидов это тоже недлинные цепочки из 3-4 правителей...


The Buyid lands formed a federation, rather than an empire. The major political units were the principalities centred on Fars, with its capital at Shiraz, al-Jibal, based on Rayy, and Iraq, including Baghdad, Basra and, very briefly, Mosul. 


One of the main sources of the intermittent conflicts which mark the history of the period was the question of succession to the various principalities. The possessions of the family were always considered as the property of the whole group, rather than of individual branches, and relatives felt that they had the right, even the duty, to interfere in times of trouble, as when ‘Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiyar seemed unable to administer Iraq effectively in 367/978 and his cousin ‘Adud al-Dawla stepped in to restore family rule in the area. Despite this family solidarity, the Buyids never developed an ordered system of inheritance; as in eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe each powerful ruler sought to provide a suitable inheritance for all his sons, even if it had to be done at the expense of his cousins. Correspondingly, all Buyid princes could feel entitled to a share of the patrimony and this right was even claimed by some, like Ibn Kakeya, who secured the independence of Isfahan in the early fifth/eleventh century, who were only related to the Buyid family by marriage.

The complex nature of family ties and obligations provided enough scope for conflict within the dynasty but there were other points of friction as well. One such was the question of succession to the title of shahanshah, effectively the presidency of the confederation. The powers this title conferred were not extensive; it was more a recognition of seniority within the family than an office with authority, rather like the title of grand prince of Kiev in twelfth-century Russia. From the beginning there was no idea that the title was hereditary, or that it was attached to any particular principality


Share this post

Link to post
Share on other sites

Занятно, насколько Иран, на самом деле ... маленький. Есть "кусочек Месопотамии" в виде Элама/Хузестана/Арабистана. Есть Табаристан/Мазендеран между Каспием и Эльбурсом. Есть восточное Закавказье в виде Азербайджана. И все. Остальная часть страны - это несколько небольших оазисов. 

Тот же сельскохозяйственный очаг у Персеполя на реке Кор - пара тысяч квадратных километров. Река Кор впадает в соленое озеро Бахтеган. Рядом - Шираз в оазисе на пересыхающей реке Рудхане Хошк. Исфахан - на реке Зайендерун, которая впадет в соленое озеро Гавхуни. Тебриз - на реке Кури, впадающей в соленое озеро Урмия. И еще один сельскохозяйственный очаг к югу от озера (с Миандоабом). Сельскохозяйственные очаг у подножия Эльбурса от Рея до Казвина (там сейчас и Тегеран стоит) утыкается с юга прямо в каменистую пустыню Деште-Кавир.


В Хорасане - не лучше. Мешхед и Нишапур расположены у подножия горы Биналуд, с двух сторон от нее. Мерв, Балх, Герат - сравнительно небольшие оазисы посреди нагромождения полупустынь, пустынь и гор.



Eberhard W. Sauer, Jebrael Nokandeh, Konstantin Pitskhelauri and Hamid Omrani Rekavandi. Innovation and Stagnation: Military Infrastructure and the Shifting Balance of Power Between Rome and Persia // Sasanian Persia. Between Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia. Edited by Eberhard W. Sauer. 2017


Занятно, кстати, выходит. Qal`eh Gabri - это сельскохозяйственный очаг Казвин-Рей. Насколько понимаю - это в принципе "всеиранский перекресток". Leilan - отмечен в районе оазиса к югу от Урмии. Укрепления на реке Горган - запирают "восточные ворота" в Табаристан. Дербент - "замок" на дороге в Закавказье.



Обычно по изогиете в 200 мм осадков в год проводят границу регионов, пригодных для земледелия. Хотя и там бывают нюансы - наличие подземных водоносных пластов, реки и т.д.

Share this post

Link to post
Share on other sites

Matthew King. The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Medieval Mediterranean. 2018

Robert Ignatius Burns. Renegades, Adventurers, and Sharp Businessmen: The Thirteenth-Century Spaniard in the Cause of Islam // The Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Oct., 1972), pp. 341-366


Most distinguished of the Almoravid Christian generals was the invincible Berengar (ibn) Reverter, viscount of Barcelona, who stemmed the Almohad advance for the caliph 'Ali; after his last battle in 1142 the Almohads crucified his corpse. One son abandoned an African military career to die as a Templar in 1207; his brother, the apostate Abu 'l-Hasan, served the Almohads until his death in battle in 1186.


J. John. Malik Ifriqiya: The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Fatimids // Libyan Studies. Volume: 18. Pages: 89-101. 1987

David Abulafia. The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Norman Expeditions to Majorca and the Muslim Mediterranean // Anglo-Norman Studies VII: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 1984: 26–49. 1985

Share this post

Link to post
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now

  • Similar Content

    • Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо).
      By hoplit
      Просмотреть файл Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо).
      Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо). Раздел "Официальные бумаги". Сс. 279. М.: Восточная литература. 2017.
      Автор hoplit Добавлен 30.04.2020 Категория Корея
    • Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо).
      By hoplit
      Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо). Раздел "Официальные бумаги". Сс. 279. М.: Восточная литература. 2017.
    • Построения из китайского военного искусства
      By Чжан Гэда
      Прочитал в "Мин цзи наньлюэ" у Цзи Люци:
      Он вообще пишет очень запутанно - похоже, сам не сильно соображал, что писал. Когда он описывал войска Чжэнов - там все очень сумбурно.
      Строй багуа был придуман легендарным Сунь Бинем в IV в. до н.э. и управлялся военачальником, которому делали охраняемую воинами вышку, с которой он подавал команды на перестроения. Система имела возможность 16-ти перестроений. К периоду Тан она трансформировалась в "строй 6 цветков" (люхуа чжэнь), который применял легендарный Ли Цзин во времена Тан:

      Слева люхуачжэнь, справа - багуачжэнь.
      Строй багуа имеет по китайским толкованиями строился на основании этого:

      В строю багуачжэнь имеется "8 врат" - сю (отдых), шэн (жизнь, рождение), шан (ранение, вред), ду (преграда), цзин (благое предзнаменование), сы (смерть), цзин (испуг), кай (раскрытие).
      Прямо на восток располагаются "врата жизни". Если ворваться в них и прорваться через "врата благого предзнаменования" на юго-западе, затем войти во "врата раскрытия" на севере, то можно уничтожить этот строй.
      Вопрос - а зачем такие сложности? Зачем так выеживаться, чтобы сделать простое дело? Вразумительных толкований найти не могу.
    • Пушки на палубах. Европа в 15-17 век.
      By hoplit
      Tullio Vidoni. Medieval seamanship under sail. 1987.
      Richard W. Unger. Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe. 1981.
      Dotson J.E. Ship types and fleet composition at Genoa and Venice in the early thirteenth century. 2002.
      John H. Pryor. The naval battles of Roger of Lauria // Journal of Medieval History (1983), 9:3, 179-216
      Lawrence Mott. The Battle of Malta, 1283: Prelude to a Disaster // The Circle of war in the middle ages. 1999. p. 145-172
      Charles D. Stanton. Roger of Lauria (c. 1250-1305): "Admiral of Admirals". 2019
      Mike Carr. Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291–1352. 2015
      Oppenheim M. A history of the administration of the royal navy and of merchant shipping in relation to the navy, from MDIX to MDCLX. 1896.
      L. G. C. Laughton. THE SQUARE-TUCK STERN AND THE GUN-DECK. 1961.
      L.G. Carr Laughton. Gunnery,Frigates and the Line of Battle. 1928.
      M.A.J. Palmer. The ‘Military Revolution’ Afloat: The Era of the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the Transition to Modern Warfare at Sea. 1997.
      A.M. Rodger. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BROADSIDE GUNNERY, 1450–1650. 1996.
      Sardinha Monteiro, Luis Nuno. FERNANDO OLIVEIRA'S ART OF WAR AT SEA (1555). 2015.
      Rudi  Roth. A  proposed standard  in  the reporting  of  historic artillery. 1989.
      Kelly R. DeVries. A 1445 Reference to Shipboard Artillery. 1990.
      J. D. Moody. OLD NAVAL GUN-CARRIAGES. 1952.
      Michael Strachan. SAMPSON'S FIGHT WITH MALTESE GALLEYS, 1628. 1969.
      Randal Gray. Spinola's Galleys in the Narrow Seas 1599–1603. 1978.
      Joseph Eliav. Tactics of Sixteenth-century Galley Artillery. 2013.
      John F. Guilmartin. The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of Its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities. 2007.
      Joseph Eliav. The Gun and Corsia of Early Modern Mediterranean Galleys: Design issues and
      rationales. 2013.
      John F. Guilmartin. The military revolution in warfare at sea during the early modern era:
      technological origins, operational outcomes and strategic consequences. 2011.
      Joe J. Simmons. Replicating Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Ordnance. 1992.
      Ricardo Cerezo Martínez. La táctica naval en el siglo XVI. Introducción y tácticas. 1983.
      Ricardo Cerezo Martínez. La batalla de las Islas Terceras, 1582. 1982.
      Ships and Guns: The Sea Ordnance in Venice and in Europe between the 15th and the 17th Centuries. 2011.
      W. P. Guthrie. Naval Actions of the Thirty Years' War // The Mariner's Mirror, 87:3, 262-280. 2001
      Steven Ashton Walton. The Art of Gunnery in Renaissance England. 1999
       L.G.Carr Laughton & Michael Lewis. Early Tudor Ship Guns // The Mariner's Mirror, 46:4 (1960), 242-285
      Brian Tunstall. Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactics, 1650-1815. 1990.
      Emir Yener. Ottoman Seapower and Naval Technology during Catherine II’s Turkish Wars 1768-1792. 2016.
      Боевые парусники уже в конце 15 века довольно похожи на своих потомков века 18. Однако есть "но". "Линейная тактика", ассоциируемая с линкорами 18 века - это не про каракки, галеоны, нао и каравеллы 16 века, она складывается только во второй половине 17 столетия. Небольшая подборка статей и книг, помогающих понять - "что было до".
      Ещё пара интересных статей. Не совсем флот и совсем не 15-17 века.
      Gijs A. Rommelse. An early modern naval revolution? The relationship between ‘economic reason of state’ and maritime warfare // Journal for Maritime Research, 13:2, 138-150. 2011.
      N. A.M. Rodger. From the ‘military revolution’ to the ‘fiscal-naval state’ // Journal for Maritime Research, 13:2, 119-128. 2011.
    • Сеньориальные и "частные" войны.
      By hoplit
      - Justine Firnhaber-Baker. From God’s Peace to the King’s Order: Late Medieval Limitations on Non-Royal Warfare // Essays in Medieval Studies Volume 23, 2006.
      - Justine Firnhaber-Baker. Seigneurial War and Royal Power in Later Medieval Southern France // Past & Present, Vol. 208, No. 1, 2010, p. 37-76.
      - Justine Firnhaber-Baker. Techniques of seigneurial war in the fourteenth century // Journal of Medieval History 36(1): 90-103. 2010.
       - Gadi Algazi. Pruning Peasants Private War and Maintaining the Lords’ Peace in Late Medieval Germany // Medieval Transformations: Texts, Power and Gifts in Context, Esther Cohen & Mayke de Jong eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 245–274.
      -  Geary Patrick J. Vivre en conflit dans une France sans État : typologie des mécanismes de règlement des conflits (1050-1200) // Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations. 41ᵉ année, N. 5, 1986. pp. 1107-1133
      Также - Justine Firnhaber-Baker. Violence and the State in Languedoc, 1250-1400. 2014.
      Сборник статей по "приватным войнам" в домонгольском Иране - Iranian Studies, volume 38, number 4, December 2005.
      - Jürgen Paul. Introduction: Private warfare in pre-Mongol Iran.
      - Ahmed Abdelsalam. The practice of violence in the ḥisba-theories.
      - Deborah Tor. Privatized Jihad and public order in the pre-Seljuq period: The role of the Mutatawwi‘a.
      - Jürgen Paul. The Seljuq conquest(s) of Nishapur: A reappraisal.
      - David Durand-guédy. Iranians at war under Turkish domination: The example of pre-Mongol Isfahan.