hoplit

Мусульманские армии Средних веков

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Hugh Kennedy. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century. 1986

Цитата

The fall of the Umayyads can be explained in many ways. At an ideological level, they failed because they could not offer the sort of leadership which many Muslims wanted. It used to be accepted that the Umayyads claimed only secular authority but recent work by Crone and Hinds has demonstrated that the Umayyad caliphs did claim a religious authority; the ruler was God’s Caliph and had the authority to make decisions about Islamic law and practice. However, there were many Muslims, especially in Iraq, who felt that charismatic, truly Islamic leadership was necessary to establish the rule of the Qur’an and Sunna. By the end of the Umayyad period it had become an article of faith among such people that only the Family of the Prophet could supply this authority.


There were also regional problems. From ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign onwards, Umayyad government had increasingly meant Syrian government. Despite attempts by ‘Umar II and others to broaden the base of the regime, the Muslims of Iraq were entirely excluded. This narrowness of support became even more pronounced with the Qaysc triumph under Marwan II; at the end even Syria and Palestine were conquered territories and Damascus had been replaced by Harran in the Jazcra as the Umayyad capital. This restricted nature of support for the regime was made more serious because neither Syria nor the Jazcra was as rich, or had such large Muslim populations as Iraq. In the second eighth century, the revenues from the alluvial areas of southern Iraq amounted to four times those from Egypt and almost five times the revenues from the whole of Syria and Palestine. Constant warfare had certainly drained the resources of manpower in Syria. The wars of Hisham’s reign against the Berbers and the internecine disputes which followed his death must have placed a considerable strain on the manpower of the Qaysc tribes who supported the last Umayyad. In addition, Marwan’s policies had spread disaffection, not just among elements traditionally hostile to the regime but among people who had previously been loyal servants, like the family of Khalid al-Qasrc and even members of the Umayyad house itself, like Hisham’s own son Sulayman. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Umayyad state was swept away.


In the final judgement, however, it would be wrong to imagine that the fall of the dynasty was inevitable. The Umayyad regime had never been as strong as it had been under Hisham only a decade before the final collapse. It was only the failure of leadership and murderous conflicts which followed his death which led to disaster and even at the end Marwan’s Qaysc supporters could raise very formidable armies to oppose the ‘Abbasids.

 

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Hugh Kennedy. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century. 1986

Цитата

The eastern frontiersmen of Khurasan defeated the men from the Byzantine frontier who supported Marwan but this did not automatically mean the triumph of the ‘Abbasid dynasty. The armies were directed by Abe Muslim and led by Khurasancs who had in many cases no direct contact with the ‘Abbasid family at all; none of the ‘Abbasids had participated in the long march across Iran and the fierce battles against the Umayyad armies of Nubata b. Hanzala and ‘Amir b. Dubara.

Цитата

The proclamation of al-Saffaq as caliph and his acceptance by the Khurasancs and the Kufans only marked the beginning of the establishment of the ‘Abbasids. A number of questions remained to be decided notably whether the ‘Abbasids were to be powerful sovereigns in the way that the Umayyads had been or simply symbolic rulers who would give legitimacy to Khurasanc military rule, and the nature of the relationship between the Khurasanc army and other elements in the Muslim community; in other words would the military dictatorship of the Qayscs simply be replaced by that of the Khurasancs. When al-Saffaq was acknowledged as caliph the answers to these questions were very uncertain and it would be hard to exaggerate the precariousness of the position of the new dynasty. That ‘Abbasid rule was established and accepted by most of the Muslim community was the achievement of the remarkable group of men who formed al-Saffaq’s immediate family and particularly of his own brother Abu Ja‘far, later the Caliph al-Mansur. Al-Saffaq himself only reigned for four years (132–6/749–54) but this period saw the establishment of ‘Abbasid power as it was to remain until after the death of Harun al-Rashid. The caliph himself is sometimes portrayed as a rather nondescript character, even a weakling, and Shaban has argued that he was chosen by the Khurasancs precisely because he was not likely to assert himself. But the historical record suggests a man who was at once cautious and determined and the establishment of the ‘Abbasids owed much to his low-key leadership in the early years.


The key to ‘Abbasid success was to leave eastern Iran in the hands of the Khurasaniyya (the men from Khurasan who had made up the ‘Abbasid army) and Abu Muslim, while establishing members of the ‘Abbasid family as commanders of armies and governors of provinces in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula. As soon as al-Saffaq becamecaliph he sent his uncle ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Alc to lead the armies opposing Marwan on the river Zab, while his brother Abu Ja‘far went to take command of the army besieging the last Umayyad governor of Iraq, Yazcd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra in Wasis. Both ‘Abd Allah and Abu Ja‘far thus acquired a following among the Khurasaniyya in the armies who came to associate their interests with those of their ‘Abbasid leaders. But both men also realized that to rely exclusively on the Khurasaniyya was a recipe for disaster, it would mean that they were little more than puppets in the hands of the military leaders and that they would incur the lasting hostility of all the other groups in the western half of the Islamic world. It would be, in fact, a denial of all the objectives of the revolution. Among the other groups they turned to were of course the Arabs of the Yamami party who had opposed Marwan II. The most famous of these were the Muhallabc family whose influence had survived the fall of Yazcd b. al-Muhallab from political power and who had attempted to take their home town of Basra for the ‘Abbasids at the time of the revolution. The family was now rewarded by governorships, in Basra itself and other areas, notably Ifrcqiya, and they enjoyed a new golden age of prosperity. Also rewarded was the family of another leading figure of the Yamami opposition, Hisham’s long-serving governor of the east, Khalid b. ‘Abd Allah al-Qasri, whose son Muqammad had brought over the town of Kefa to the ‘Abbasid cause and was now rewarded with government appointments, although his family never achieved the eminence of the Muhallabcs.


More striking is the efforts the early ‘Abbasids made to win over the leaders of the Qays. Abu Ja‘far seems to have attempted a compromise with the arch-Qaysc Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra, but was thwarted by Abu Muslim who instructed al-Saffaq to have Yazid executed. Both ‘Abd Allah and Abu Ja‘far did, however, win over many of the Qayscs of the Byzantine and Armenian frontier lands, notably Marwan’s righthand man in the area, Isqaq b. Muslim al-‘Uqaylc, who was to become part of al-Mansur’s inner circle of advisers. Another Qaysc family which survived to enjoy honour and power were the descendants of Qutayba b. Muslim, the conqueror of Bukhara and Samarqand, whose associations with the Umayyad cause did not prevent them being recruited to the ‘Abbasids. One group alone was excluded from this general reconciliation, the members of the Umayyad family itself. All the prominent Umayyads were hunted down and many of them executed by ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Alc when he took over Syria, only one, ‘Abd al-Raqman b. Mu‘awiya, a grandson of the Caliph Hisham, escaping to join supporters in Muslim Spain where he founded a long-lived and successful branch of the dynasty at the western end of the Islamic world.

 

С другой стороны - в конце 820-х частной армии Абу Ишака аль-Мутасима из 3-4 тысяч тюрок окажется достаточно, чтобы прогнуть халифат под себя... =/

Цитата

Al-Mu‘tasim was in many ways a new man himself; one of Harun’s younger sons, he had been given no place in the elaborate succession arrangements his father had worked out and he was only fifteen years old at the outbreak of the civil war. 

...

From 199/814–15 he began to buy slaves in Baghdad from their previous owners and to train them for military service, and both Itakh, a Khazar who had been a cook for his previous owner, and Ashinas were in his service before 202/817–18. He also entered into an arrangement with the Samanid family who controlled much of the Samarqand area and sent him slaves directly from Turkestan. The private army he built up probably only numbered 3,000–4,000 by the end of al-Ma’mun’s reign but they were well trained and disciplined and formed a formidable fighting force.

...

When in 213/828 ‘Abd Allah b. Tahir was appointed governor of Khurasan on the death of his brother
Talqa, al-Mu‘tasim took over all his responsibilities in Syria and Egypt, thus becoming one of the most powerful men in the caliphate. It was this military power, coupled with al-Mu‘tasim’s own forceful and determined personality which induced al-Ma’mun to set aside the claims of his own son al-‘Abbas and to adopt al-Mu‘tasim as his heir. When al-Ma’mun died in 218/833 during a campaign against the Byzantines, his brother was accepted as caliph, not without some murmurings of dissent from those who saw clearly what the new regime would bring.

The new order was based firmly on the army al-Mu‘tasim had built up.

 

В указанный период Багдад (ошметки абна) и Большой Хорасан контролировали Тахириды, одна из опор режима. Потеряют контроль над Хорасаном они как раз в период "Анархии в Самарре" и после нее.

Цитата

It is important to remember, too, that the Tahirids were as powerful in Baghdad as in Khurasan itself and it is probable that the revenues of Khurasan were used to maintain the family’s influence in that city. When ‘Abd Allah b. Tahir had left to take up his position in Khurasan in 213/828 he was succeeded in Baghdad by his cousin Isqaq b. Ibrahim who remained effective ruler of the city until his death over twenty years later in 235/850 after which he was followed by other members of the family. It was this Tahirid control which secured the loyalty of the Baghdadis to the caliphate, especially after al-Mu‘tarim had moved the capital to Samarra, and it was the Tahirids who suppressed the only real disturbance in the city during these years, the conspiracy of Aqmad b. Nasr al-Khuza‘i in 231/846. One of the main reasons for the civil war had been the desire of the abna under ‘Ali b. ‘Isa to have access to the tax revenues of Khurasan; now, under Tahirid patronage, their children had just that. Baghdad could prove useful to the caliphs as a rival source of power to Samarra with its Turkish population; when al-Mutawakkil wished to dispose of the Turk Itakh in 235/849 he arranged that the execution should be carried out by the Tahirids in Baghdad, safely away from Itakh’s followers in Samarra.

 

Цитата

By 335/946 the three sons of Buya had established themselves in effective control of Fars, Iraq and Rayy, and their descendants were able to maintain themselves in most of those areas until the coming of the Seljuks, a century later. The history of the Buyid period is very confused and full of marches, battles and succession disputes which seem both ephemeral and pointless. The historian’s task is complicated by the fact that there were at least three and sometimes more centres of activity which were at the same time closely interconnected. This means that the narrative thread is thoroughly tangled and the position is made more difficult by the fact that the sources are very uneven. It is clear that Fars was the most important province of the Buyid confederation but the narratives on which we depend are largely based on Baghdad material and show almost no concern for events in Fars at all, while on the other hand we are very well informed about Iraqi affairs which were in some ways marginal to Buyid history. None the less, events in Baghdad are of great interest for social and cultural reasons, since it was in Baghdad at this time that the doctrinal positions of imami Shi‘ism and Sunnc Islam were worked out. Baghdad then, attracts more attention than its purely political importance would warrant.

Buyid history can be chronologically divided, roughly, into two divisions. The first half-century, up to the death of ‘Adud al-Dawla, greatest of the Buyid rulers, in 372/983, is one of growth and consolidation when the political initiative was firmly in the hands of the princes of the ruling dynasty. From that point, however, the Buyids were on the defensive, especially in Iraq and central Iran, and political initiative passed to the hands of groups of soldiers and administrators who strove to manipulate their nominal rulers in their own interests.

Опять "великая держава одного четырех двух человек". Али ибн Буя Имад аль-Даула с двумя братьями создал державу ("конфедерацию") Буидов, воспользовавшись прогрессирующим кризисом Аббасидов. Его племянник Хосров (!) Адуд аль-Даула - пик силы Буидов. И все. 

С другой стороны - "золотой век" Омейядов-Марванидов и Аббасидов это тоже недлинные цепочки из 3-4 правителей...

Цитата

The Buyid lands formed a federation, rather than an empire. The major political units were the principalities centred on Fars, with its capital at Shiraz, al-Jibal, based on Rayy, and Iraq, including Baghdad, Basra and, very briefly, Mosul. 

...

One of the main sources of the intermittent conflicts which mark the history of the period was the question of succession to the various principalities. The possessions of the family were always considered as the property of the whole group, rather than of individual branches, and relatives felt that they had the right, even the duty, to interfere in times of trouble, as when ‘Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiyar seemed unable to administer Iraq effectively in 367/978 and his cousin ‘Adud al-Dawla stepped in to restore family rule in the area. Despite this family solidarity, the Buyids never developed an ordered system of inheritance; as in eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe each powerful ruler sought to provide a suitable inheritance for all his sons, even if it had to be done at the expense of his cousins. Correspondingly, all Buyid princes could feel entitled to a share of the patrimony and this right was even claimed by some, like Ibn Kakeya, who secured the independence of Isfahan in the early fifth/eleventh century, who were only related to the Buyid family by marriage.


The complex nature of family ties and obligations provided enough scope for conflict within the dynasty but there were other points of friction as well. One such was the question of succession to the title of shahanshah, effectively the presidency of the confederation. The powers this title conferred were not extensive; it was more a recognition of seniority within the family than an office with authority, rather like the title of grand prince of Kiev in twelfth-century Russia. From the beginning there was no idea that the title was hereditary, or that it was attached to any particular principality

 

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Занятно, насколько Иран, на самом деле ... маленький. Есть "кусочек Месопотамии" в виде Элама/Хузестана/Арабистана. Есть Табаристан/Мазендеран между Каспием и Эльбурсом. Есть восточное Закавказье в виде Азербайджана. И все. Остальная часть страны - это несколько небольших оазисов. 

Тот же сельскохозяйственный очаг у Персеполя на реке Кор - пара тысяч квадратных километров. Река Кор впадает в соленое озеро Бахтеган. Рядом - Шираз в оазисе на пересыхающей реке Рудхане Хошк. Исфахан - на реке Зайендерун, которая впадет в соленое озеро Гавхуни. Тебриз - на реке Кури, впадающей в соленое озеро Урмия. И еще один сельскохозяйственный очаг к югу от озера (с Миандоабом). Сельскохозяйственные очаг у подножия Эльбурса от Рея до Казвина (там сейчас и Тегеран стоит) утыкается с юга прямо в каменистую пустыню Деште-Кавир.

 

В Хорасане - не лучше. Мешхед и Нишапур расположены у подножия горы Биналуд, с двух сторон от нее. Мерв, Балх, Герат - сравнительно небольшие оазисы посреди нагромождения полупустынь, пустынь и гор.

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Eberhard W. Sauer, Jebrael Nokandeh, Konstantin Pitskhelauri and Hamid Omrani Rekavandi. Innovation and Stagnation: Military Infrastructure and the Shifting Balance of Power Between Rome and Persia // Sasanian Persia. Between Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia. Edited by Eberhard W. Sauer. 2017

Operativnaya_sistema_Sasanidov.thumb.jpg

Занятно, кстати, выходит. Qal`eh Gabri - это сельскохозяйственный очаг Казвин-Рей. Насколько понимаю - это в принципе "всеиранский перекресток". Leilan - отмечен в районе оазиса к югу от Урмии. Укрепления на реке Горган - запирают "восточные ворота" в Табаристан. Дербент - "замок" на дороге в Закавказье.

 

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Обычно по изогиете в 200 мм осадков в год проводят границу регионов, пригодных для земледелия. Хотя и там бывают нюансы - наличие подземных водоносных пластов, реки и т.д.

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Matthew King. The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Medieval Mediterranean. 2018

Robert Ignatius Burns. Renegades, Adventurers, and Sharp Businessmen: The Thirteenth-Century Spaniard in the Cause of Islam // The Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Oct., 1972), pp. 341-366

Цитата

Most distinguished of the Almoravid Christian generals was the invincible Berengar (ibn) Reverter, viscount of Barcelona, who stemmed the Almohad advance for the caliph 'Ali; after his last battle in 1142 the Almohads crucified his corpse. One son abandoned an African military career to die as a Templar in 1207; his brother, the apostate Abu 'l-Hasan, served the Almohads until his death in battle in 1186.

 

J. John. Malik Ifriqiya: The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Fatimids // Libyan Studies. Volume: 18. Pages: 89-101. 1987

David Abulafia. The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Norman Expeditions to Majorca and the Muslim Mediterranean // Anglo-Norman Studies VII: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 1984: 26–49. 1985

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Roger Collins. Caliphs and Kings Spain, 796–1031. 2012

Цитата

In recent years, to bring up the Umayyad period in Spanish history in casual conversation with friends, colleagues, and complete strangers often raises the issue of whether this was indeed that golden age of tolerance in which members of the three Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam coexisted in harmony and mutual respect. To which question there can be but one quick answer, and that is a wholly negative one. If a fuller or more nuanced reply is required, then it would involve saying that if there were any truth in such a notion then it only applied for a very limited period of forty years or fewer in the mid-tenth century, in just one location, the city of Córdoba, and to a very small sector of society, the intellectual elite attached to the caliphal court. Beyond these chronological, geographical, and social confines, life in Umayyad al-Andalus as recorded in our far from insubstantial sources looks more like Thomas Hobbes’s war of all against all than a realization of the prophetic vision of the wolf dwelling with the lamb, and the lion lying down with the goat.

Цитата

However, in the late 1980s, when it was first published, that tradition had yet to come to terms with the idea that these sources, all dating to the tenth century or there after, were not objective reports of the events of the early eighth century that just needed to have their narratives rationalized, despite fundamental divergences between them, so as to provide a seamless account of the events and personalities of that period.

 

Насколько понял - Андалус с момента своего формирования и далее на протяжении двух веков был в состоянии "неспокойствия". Там постоянно "тянуло дымом" и периодически "бабахало". И то, что в конце 9 века эмират рассыпался - результат, возможно, не того, что "бахать" стало чаще или сильнее, а того, что конкретный правитель в "обычных условиях" действовал не так успешно, как его предшественники.

Цитата

Such expeditions could therefore be legitimately directed against those within al-Andalus who were resisting the ruler’s authority. They became the principal way in which his power could be expressed in the frontier territories, and this was often more of a primary purpose than the chastisement of unbelievers outwith al-Andalus. However, for these expeditions to be effective they depended on the tax receipts and military contributions that the frontier marches would be expected to make. The more numerous and geographically widespread the rejections of the Umayyads’ authority, the more difficult it became for them to reimpose it. Facing resistance in several different regions made it all the more important that it be effectively repressed in each of them in turn, as happened under ‘Abdal-Rahman II. In the reign of Muhammad I, however, we see a succession of partial and incomplete solutions, with the geographical focus of campaigns shifting from year to year, rebels being defeated but left still active and able to reestablish themselves. When a new focus of rebellion emerged in the south, in the region of Málaga, at the very end of the reign, military resources were just stretched even further, and the cycle of the ineffectual attempts at the repression of opposition became even wider. Following al-Mundhir’s failure to crush Ibn Hafsun in 888 a full-blown crisis nearly overwhelmed the Umayyad dynasty.

Вообще, насколько понимаю, в современной исторической литературе это довольно распространенный подход. К примеру - Simon MacLean. Kingship and Politics in the Late Ninth Century. Charles the Fat and the End of the Carolingian Empire. Не "подъем [нужное вписать] сил", а "династический кризис". Сначала Карл Толстый не совладал с обстановкой, потом Арнульф заигрался - и понеслось. Если бы Арнульф, банально, преуспел в изображении себя "природным Каролингом" - весь расклад мог изрядно поменяться.

 

Цитата

In some ways the situation around 1013 was very similar to that encountered almost exactly one hundred years earlier, with al-Andalus divided up into a set of territories whose rulers either ignored or were in active conflict both with their neighbors and with the former central authority, the Umayyad realm. In both periods these local regimes were created by the men who controlled the military muscle that gave them the power, if not the legitimacy, to do so. Many of them were probably economically better fortheir inhabitants than the Umayyad rule they replaced, as all of the taxes (mainly but not exclusively from the non-Muslim population) and profits of trade otherwise tended to flow mono-directionally towards Córdoba where they benefitted the monarchs, their courtiers and favorites, and even some of its citizenry, but gave no corresponding returns to the inhabitants of the frontier marches and the other districts of al-Andalus. Tenth-century Córdoba can be seen as a bloated fungal growth created in the first instance by ‘Abd al-Rahman III as an unintended consequence of his way of dealing with the decline of Umayyad authority in preceding decades. A century later, the Ta’ifa kingdoms were a similar response to the weakening of central power, but this time there was no center left to try to regain control of the periphery: it had been smashed irreparably in the events that unfolded in and around Córdoba from 1008 to 1013.

 

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Hugh Kennedy. Muslim Spain and Portugal A Political History of al-Andalus. 1996

Цитата

Our understanding of the Muslim conquest of al-Andalus and the establishment of Arab rule is hampered by the nature of the sources. No contemporary Arabic accounts of the conquest survive and the earliest major sources which have been passed down to us are collections of historical anecdotes (akhbar) preserved in a number of works dating from the tenth century onwards, notably the anonymous Akhbar al-Majmua (Collection of Anecdotes) from possibly c. 940 and the Tarikh Iftitah al-Andalus (History of the Conquest of al-Andalus) of Ibn al-Qutiya (d. 977). Both these collections arrange their materials more or less in chronological order but they are not annals and are more concerned with vivid and interesting stories than the careful ordering of events. The Akhbar is particularly important for the pre-Umayyad period, while Ibn al-Qutiya gives vivid and gossipy accounts of the courts of the Umayyad amirs.


In the tenth century these accounts were edited and systematised using the criteria of annalistic historiography developed in the eastern Islamic world by such authorities as al-Mada’ini (d. 839) and al-Tabari (d. 923). In al-Andalus this editing seems to have been the work of the RazI family, originally from Rayy in central Iran, who had come to al-Andalus as merchants in the late ninth century. According to his son ‘Isa (d. 989), it was Ahmad b. Musa al-RazI (d. 955) who took the akhbar which people in al-Andalus had not previously been very interested in and ordered them (dawwana) according to the rules of historical science. The writings of the Razis, father and son, have largely been lost but they were used, and often incorporated entirely, with acknowledgements, by the great eleventh-century compiler Ibn Hayyan (d. 1076). Much of Ibn Hayyan’s work has in turn been lost, including the sections which dealt with the conquests and the early amirs. Some of his material has, however, been preserved in shorter works, like the anonymous Path al-Andalus of c. 1100, and later abbreviated recensions in annalistic compilations like Ibn Idhari's Bayan al-Maghrib of about 1300.


The fact that the sources as they have reached us were written down at least two centuries after the events has meant that fierce controversy has raged about the relative merits and reliability of these sources. Opinions have varied between historians like Taha, on the one hand, who accept the Arabic narratives almost completely, and Collins, who holds that the Arabic tradition is virtually worthless.

It is important to attempt to assess the reliability of this material. Clearly these Arab histories are biased in the sense that they are in favour of Muslim victories and claimed that these were the result of God’s support, but this sort of open partisanship does not present real problems to the modern historian. There are, however, a variety of other ways in which the material needs to be treated with caution.


There is material which is clearly legendary or folkloric, like the story of the locked chamber in Toledo which King Roderick was rash enough to open, only to find that the interior was covered by paintings of Arab warriors, and, probably, the story of Count Julian and the rape of his daughter by King Roderick. These stories, with their obvious predictive and entertaining functions, are unlikely to mislead historians. The use of topoi and conventional phrases, expressions and characterisation borrowed from eastern Islamic sources may also give a false impression of detailed accuracy.


There may also have been more hard-headed reasons for being economical with the truth. The nature of the conquest affected the status of the lands conquered: if they were conquered by force ('anwatan) they became the property of the conquerors, the indivisible fay' (immovable booty) of the Muslims, and the proceeds from these properties were to be used for the benefit of the Muslims as their ruler saw fit. If the lands were taken peacefully (sulhan), on the other hand, they continued to be the absolute property of the inhabitants and would only pass into Muslim hands by inheritance, purchase or conversion of the owner, in which case they would be the absolute property of their Muslim owners. There is some evidence of two historiographical traditions within the accounts of the conquests. The first, reported by the Razls and other sources close to the Umayyad court, emphasises the forceful nature of the conquest, since conquest by force would give the Umayyads the right to dispose of the lands, whereas other accounts talk of take-over by agreement and so emphasise the rights of the owners. This may account for disagreements in the sources about the nature of the conquest, and such details as the fall of Seville, which is said to have surrendered peacefully and then rebelled and had to be subdued by force, may be explained as attempts to conflate two contradictory traditions. In the end, however, it must be admitted that these divisions of opinion could simply be the result of genuine confusion over events which happened long ago.

С другой стороны 

Цитата

The fact that these sources, in the form in which they have been handed down to us, are much later need not undermine their credibility. The Arabic historical tradition laid great emphasis on preserving the wording and forms of old accounts and much of the work of compilers like Ibn Hayyan was basically editing and republishing older materials, rather than composing a new account. Later chronicles can contain important nuggets of information which survive from much earlier times: the most important account of the nature of the settlement of the Syrian junds in al-Andalus after 741, for example, is found in fragments of al-Razi embedded in the late fourteenth-century Ihata of Ibn al-Khatlb, composed in its present form 650 years after the events it describes.

То есть - переработка и переделка более ранних материалов для арабской исторической традиции нехарактерна. И если текст ссылается на более раннюю работу - с высокой вероятностью он скопирован оттуда с высокой степенью точности.

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  • Similar Content

    • "Примитивная война".
      By hoplit
      Небольшая подборка литературы по "примитивному" военному делу.
       
      - Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Study of Stone Age Weaponry. Edited by Eric Delson, Eric J. Sargis.
      - Л. Б. Вишняцкий. Вооруженное насилие в палеолите.
      - J. Christensen. Warfare in the European Neolithic.
      - DETLEF GRONENBORN. CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIO-POLITICAL CRISES: SOME CASES FROM NEOLITHIC CENTRAL EUROPE.
      - William A. Parkinson and Paul R. Duffy. Fortifications and Enclosures in European Prehistory: A Cross-Cultural Perspective.
      - Clare, L., Rohling, E.J., Weninger, B. and Hilpert, J. Warfare in Late Neolithic\Early Chalcolithic Pisidia, southwestern Turkey. Climate induced social unrest in the late 7th millennium calBC.
      - ПЕРШИЦ А. И., СЕМЕНОВ Ю. И., ШНИРЕЛЬМАН В. А. Война и мир в ранней истории человечества.
      - Алексеев А.Н., Жирков Э.К., Степанов А.Д., Шараборин А.К., Алексеева Л.Л. Погребение ымыяхтахского воина в местности Кёрдюген.
      -  José María Gómez, Miguel Verdú, Adela González-Megías & Marcos Méndez. The phylogenetic roots of human lethal violence // Nature 538, 233–237
      - Sticks, Stones, and Broken Bones: Neolithic Violence in a European Perspective. 2012
       
       
      - Иванчик А.И. Воины-псы. Мужские союзы и скифские вторжения в Переднюю Азию.
      - Α.Κ. Нефёдкин. ТАКТИКА СЛАВЯН В VI в. (ПО СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВАМ РАННЕВИЗАНТИЙСКИХ АВТОРОВ).
      - Цыбикдоржиев Д.В. Мужской союз, дружина и гвардия у монголов: преемственность и
      конфликты.
      - Вдовченков E.B. Происхождение дружины и мужские союзы: сравнительно-исторический анализ и проблемы политогенеза в древних обществах.
      - Louise E. Sweet. Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin: A Mechanism of Ecological Adaptation //  American Aiztlzropologist 67, 1965.
      - Peters E.L. Some Structural Aspects of the Feud among the Camel-Herding Bedouin of Cyrenaica // Africa: Journal of the International African Institute,  Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 1967), pp. 261-282
       
       
      - Зуев А.С. О БОЕВОЙ ТАКТИКЕ И ВОЕННОМ МЕНТАЛИТЕТЕ КОРЯКОВ, ЧУКЧЕЙ И ЭСКИМОСОВ.
      - Зуев А.С. Диалог культур на поле боя (о военном менталитете народов северо-востока Сибири в XVII–XVIII вв.).
      - О. А. Митько. ЛЮДИ И ОРУЖИЕ (воинская культура русских первопроходцев и коренного населения Сибири в эпоху позднего средневековья).
      - К. Г. Карачаров, Д. И. Ражев. ОБЫЧАЙ СКАЛЬПИРОВАНИЯ НА СЕВЕРЕ ЗАПАДНОЙ СИБИРИ В СРЕДНИЕ ВЕКА.
      - Нефёдкин А. К. Военное дело чукчей (середина XVII—начало XX в.).
      - Зуев А.С. Русско-аборигенные отношения на крайнем Северо-Востоке Сибири во второй половине  XVII – первой четверти  XVIII  вв.
      - Антропова В.В. Вопросы военной организации и военного дела у народов крайнего Северо-Востока Сибири.
      - Головнев А.В. Говорящие культуры. Традиции самодийцев и угров.
      - Laufer В. Chinese Clay Figures. Pt. I. Prolegomena on the History of Defensive Armor // Field Museum of Natural History Publication 177. Anthropological Series. Vol. 13. Chicago. 1914. № 2. P. 73-315.
      - Защитное вооружение тунгусов в XVII – XVIII вв. [Tungus' armour] // Воинские традиции в археологическом контексте: от позднего латена до позднего средневековья / Составитель И. Г. Бурцев. Тула: Государственный военно-исторический и природный музей-заповедник «Куликово поле», 2014. С. 221-225.
       
      - N. W. Simmonds. Archery in South East Asia s the Pacific.
      - Inez de Beauclair. Fightings and Weapons of the Yami of Botel Tobago.
      - Adria Holmes Katz. Corselets of Fiber: Robert Louis Stevenson's Gilbertese Armor.
      - Laura Lee Junker. WARRIOR BURIALS AND THE NATURE OF WARFARE IN PREHISPANIC PHILIPPINE CHIEFDOMS.
      - Andrew  P.  Vayda. WAR  IN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE PERSISTENCE,  CHANGE,  AND  ADAPTIVE PROCESSES IN  THREE  OCEANIAN  SOCIETIES.
      - D. U. Urlich. THE INTRODUCTION AND DIFFUSION OF FIREARMS IN NEW ZEALAND 1800-1840.
      - Alphonse Riesenfeld. Rattan Cuirasses and Gourd Penis-Cases in New Guinea.
      - W. Lloyd Warner. Murngin Warfare.
      - E. W. Gudger. Helmets from Skins of the Porcupine-Fish.
      - K. R. HOWE. Firearms and Indigenous Warfare: a Case Study.
      - Paul  D'Arcy. FIREARMS  ON  MALAITA  - 1870-1900. 
      - William Churchill. Club Types of Nuclear Polynesia.
      - Henry Reynolds. Forgotten war. 
      - Henry Reynolds. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER. Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia.
      -  Ronald M. Berndt. Warfare in the New Guinea Highlands.
      - Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern. Feasting on My Enemy: Images of Violence and Change in the New Guinea Highlands.
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Modes of Social Action in Armed Combat: Affect, Tradition and Reason in Tausug Private Warfare // Man New Series, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 586-596
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Reciprocity and Revenge in the Philippines: Some Preliminary Remarks about the Tausug of Jolo // Philippine Sociological Review. Vol. 16, No. 3/4 (JULY-OCTOBER, 1968), pp. 124-131
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Parrang Sabbil: Ritual suicide among the Tausug of Jolo // Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde. Deel 129, 1ste Afl., ANTHROPOLOGICA XV (1973), pp. 108-123
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Institutionalized Friendship and Warfare among the Tausug of Jolo // Ethnology. Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul., 1968), pp. 225-244
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Power, Politics and Guns in Jolo: The Influence of Modern Weapons on Tao-Sug Legal and Economic Institutions // Philippine Sociological Review. Vol. 15, No. 1/2, Proceedings of the Fifth Visayas-Mindanao Convention: Philippine Sociological Society May 1-2, 1967 (JANUARY-APRIL, 1967), pp. 21-29
      - Armando L. Tan. Shame, Reciprocity and Revenge: Some Reflections on the Ideological Basis of Tausug Conflict // Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society. Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1981), pp. 294-300.
      - Karl G. Heider, Robert Gardner. Gardens of War: Life and Death in the New Guinea Stone Age. 1968.
      - P. D'Arcy. Maori and Muskets from a Pan-Polynesian Perspective // The New Zealand journal of history 34(1):117-132. April 2000. 
      - Andrew P. Vayda. Maoris and Muskets in New Zealand: Disruption of a War System // Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 85, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 560-584
      - D. U. Urlich. The Introduction and Diffusion of Firearms in New Zealand 1800–1840 // The Journal of the Polynesian Society. Vol. 79, No. 4 (DECEMBER 1970), pp. 399-41
      -  Barry Craig. Material culture of the upper Sepik‪ // Journal de la Société des Océanistes 2018/1 (n° 146), pages 189 à 201
      -  Paul B. Rosco. Warfare, Terrain, and Political Expansion // Human Ecology. Vol. 20, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 1-20
      - Anne-Marie Pétrequin and Pierre Pétrequin. Flèches de chasse, flèches de guerre: Le cas des Danis d'Irian Jaya (Indonésie) // Anne-Marie Pétrequin and Pierre Pétrequin. Bulletin de la Société préhistorique française. T. 87, No. 10/12, Spécial bilan de l'année de l'archéologie (1990), pp. 484-511
      - Warfare // Douglas L. Oliver. Ancient Tahitian Society. 1974
       
       
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Higi Armed Combat.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. THE EVOLUTION OF ZULU WARFARE.
      - Myron J. Echenberg. Late nineteenth-century military technology in Upper Volta // The Journal of African History, 12, pp 241-254. 1971.
      - E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Zande Warfare // Anthropos, Bd. 52, H. 1./2. (1957), pp. 239-262
      - Julian Cobbing. The Evolution of Ndebele Amabutho // The Journal of African History. Vol. 15, No. 4 (1974), pp. 607-631
       
       
      - Elizabeth Arkush and Charles Stanish. Interpreting Conflict in the Ancient Andes: Implications for the Archaeology of Warfare.
      - Elizabeth Arkush. War, Chronology, and Causality in the Titicaca Basin.
      - R.B. Ferguson. Blood of the Leviathan: Western Contact and Warfare in Amazonia.
      - J. Lizot. Population, Resources and Warfare Among the Yanomami.
      - Bruce Albert. On Yanomami Warfare: Rejoinder.
      - R. Brian Ferguson. Game Wars? Ecology and Conflict in Amazonia. 
      - R. Brian Ferguson. Ecological Consequences of Amazonian Warfare.
      - Marvin Harris. Animal Capture and Yanomamo Warfare: Retrospect and New Evidence.
       
       
      - Lydia T. Black. Warriors of Kodiak: Military Traditions of Kodiak Islanders.
      - Herbert D. G. Maschner and Katherine L. Reedy-Maschner. Raid, Retreat, Defend (Repeat): The Archaeology and Ethnohistory of Warfare on the North Pacific Rim.
      - Bruce Graham Trigger. Trade and Tribal Warfare on the St. Lawrence in the Sixteenth Century.
      - T. M. Hamilton. The Eskimo Bow and the Asiatic Composite.
      - Owen K. Mason. The Contest between the Ipiutak, Old Bering Sea, and Birnirk Polities and
      the Origin of Whaling during the First Millennium A.D. along Bering Strait.
      - Caroline Funk. The Bow and Arrow War Days on the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta of Alaska.
      - HERBERT MASCHNER AND OWEN K. MASON. The Bow and Arrow in Northern North America. 
      - NATHAN S. LOWREY. AN ETHNOARCHAEOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROJECTILE POINT AND ARMOR TECHNOLOGIES OF THE NORTHWEST COAST.
      - F. A. Golder. Primitive Warfare among the Natives of Western Alaska. 
      - Donald Mitchell. Predatory Warfare, Social Status, and the North Pacific Slave Trade. 
      - H. Kory Cooper and Gabriel J. Bowen. Metal Armor from St. Lawrence Island. 
      - Katherine L. Reedy-Maschner and Herbert D. G. Maschner. Marauding Middlemen: Western Expansion and Violent Conflict in the Subarctic.
      - Madonna L. Moss and Jon M. Erlandson. Forts, Refuge Rocks, and Defensive Sites: The Antiquity of Warfare along the North Pacific Coast of North America.
      - Owen K. Mason. Flight from the Bering Strait: Did Siberian Punuk/Thule Military Cadres Conquer Northwest Alaska?
      - Joan B. Townsend. Firearms against Native Arms: A Study in Comparative Efficiencies with an Alaskan Example. 
      - Jerry Melbye and Scott I. Fairgrieve. A Massacre and Possible Cannibalism in the Canadian Arctic: New Evidence from the Saunaktuk Site (NgTn-1).
       
       
      - ФРЭНК СЕКОЙ. ВОЕННЫЕ НАВЫКИ ИНДЕЙЦЕВ ВЕЛИКИХ РАВНИН.
      - Hoig, Stan. Tribal Wars of the Southern Plains.
      - D. E. Worcester. Spanish Horses among the Plains Tribes.
      - DANIEL J. GELO AND LAWRENCE T. JONES III. Photographic Evidence for Southern
      Plains Armor.
      - Heinz W. Pyszczyk. Historic Period Metal Projectile Points and Arrows, Alberta, Canada: A Theory for Aboriginal Arrow Design on the Great Plains.
      - Waldo R. Wedel. CHAIN MAIL IN PLAINS ARCHEOLOGY.
      - Mavis Greer and John Greer. Armored Horses in Northwestern Plains Rock Art.
      - James D. Keyser, Mavis Greer and John Greer. Arminto Petroglyphs: Rock Art Damage Assessment and Management Considerations in Central Wyoming.
      - Mavis Greer and John Greer. Armored
 Horses 
in 
the 
Musselshell
 Rock 
Art
 of Central
 Montana.
      - Thomas Frank Schilz and Donald E. Worcester. The Spread of Firearms among the Indian Tribes on the Northern Frontier of New Spain.
      - Стукалин Ю. Военное дело индейцев Дикого Запада. Энциклопедия.
      - James D. Keyser and Michael A. Klassen. Plains Indian rock art.
       
      - D. Bruce Dickson. The Yanomamo of the Mississippi Valley? Some Reflections on Larson (1972), Gibson (1974), and Mississippian Period Warfare in the Southeastern United States.
      - Steve A. Tomka. THE ADOPTION OF THE BOW AND ARROW: A MODEL BASED ON EXPERIMENTAL PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS.
      - Wayne  William  Van  Horne. The  Warclub: Weapon  and  symbol  in  Southeastern  Indian  Societies.
      - W.  KARL  HUTCHINGS s  LORENZ  W.  BRUCHER. Spearthrower performance: ethnographic
      and  experimental research.
      - DOUGLAS J. KENNETT, PATRICIA M. LAMBERT, JOHN R. JOHNSON, AND BRENDAN J. CULLETON. Sociopolitical Effects of Bow and Arrow Technology in Prehistoric Coastal California.
      - The Ethics of Anthropology and Amerindian Research Reporting on Environmental Degradation
      and Warfare. Editors Richard J. Chacon, Rubén G. Mendoza.
      - Walter Hough. Primitive American Armor. 
      - George R. Milner. Nineteenth-Century Arrow Wounds and Perceptions of Prehistoric Warfare.
      - Patricia M. Lambert. The Archaeology of War: A North American Perspective.
      - David E. Jonesэ Native North American Armor, Shields, and Fortifications.
      - Laubin, Reginald. Laubin, Gladys. American Indian Archery.
      - Karl T. Steinen. AMBUSHES, RAIDS, AND PALISADES: MISSISSIPPIAN WARFARE IN THE INTERIOR SOUTHEAST.
      - Jon L. Gibson. Aboriginal Warfare in the Protohistoric Southeast: An Alternative Perspective. 
      - Barbara A. Purdy. Weapons, Strategies, and Tactics of the Europeans and the Indians in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Florida.
      - Charles Hudson. A Spanish-Coosa Alliance in Sixteenth-Century North Georgia.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Why the Iroquois Won: An Analysis of Iroquois Military Tactics.
      - George R. Milner. Warfare in Prehistoric and Early Historic Eastern North America // Journal of Archaeological Research, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 105-151
      - George R. Milner, Eve Anderson and Virginia G. Smith. Warfare in Late Prehistoric West-Central Illinois // American Antiquity. Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 581-603
      - Daniel K. Richter. War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience. 
      - Jeffrey P. Blick. The Iroquois practice of genocidal warfare (1534‐1787).
      - Michael S. Nassaney and Kendra Pyle. The Adoption of the Bow and Arrow in Eastern North America: A View from Central Arkansas.
      - J. Ned Woodall. MISSISSIPPIAN EXPANSION ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER: ONE STRATEGY IN THE NORTH CAROLINA PIEDMONT.
      - Roger Carpenter. Making War More Lethal: Iroquois vs. Huron in the Great Lakes Region, 1609 to 1650.
      - Craig S. Keener. An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Iroquois Assault Tactics Used against Fortified Settlements of the Northeast in the Seventeenth Century.
      - Leroy V. Eid. A Kind of : Running Fight: Indian Battlefield Tactics in the Late Eighteenth Century.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Huron vs. Iroquois: A Case Study in Inter-Tribal Warfare.
      - William J. Hunt, Jr. Ethnicity and Firearms in the Upper Missouri Bison-Robe Trade: An Examination of Weapon Preference and Utilization at Fort Union Trading Post N.H.S., North Dakota.
      - Patrick M. Malone. Changing Military Technology Among the Indians of Southern New England, 1600-1677.
      - David H. Dye. War Paths, Peace Paths An Archaeology of Cooperation and Conflict in Native Eastern North America.
      - Wayne Van Horne. Warfare in Mississippian Chiefdoms.
      - Wayne E. Lee. The Military Revolution of Native North America: Firearms, Forts, and Polities // Empires and indigenes: intercultural alliance, imperial expansion, and warfare in the early modern world. Edited by Wayne E. Lee. 2011
      - Steven LeBlanc. Prehistoric Warfare in the American Southwest. 1999.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. A History of Research on Warfare in Anthropology // American Anthropologist. Vol. 101, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 794-805
      - Lee, Wayne. Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation // The Journal of Military History, Volume 68, Number 3, July 2004, pp. 713-770
      - Wayne E. Lee. Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800 // The Journal of Military History. Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), pp. 701-741
       
      - Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World. 2011
      - A. Gat. War in Human Civilization.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Killing of Captured Enemies: A Cross‐cultural Study.
      - Azar Gat. The Causes and Origins of "Primitive Warfare": Reply to Ferguson.
      - Azar Gat. The Pattern of Fighting in Simple, Small-Scale, Prestate Societies.
      - Lawrence H. Keeley. War Before Civilization: the Myth of the Peaceful Savage.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Warfare and Its Relationship to the Origins of Agriculture.
      - Jonathan Haas. Warfare and the Evolution of Culture.
      - М. Дэйви. Эволюция войн.
      - War in the Tribal Zone Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare Edited by R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead.
      - I. J. N. Thorpe. Anthropology, Archaeology, and the Origin of Warfare.
      - Антропология насилия. Новосибирск. 2010.
      - Jean Guilaine and Jean Zammit. The origins of war : violence in prehistory. 2005. Французское издание было в 2001 году - le Sentier de la Guerre: Visages de la violence préhistorique.
      - Warfare in Bronze Age Society. 2018

    • Пушки на палубах. Европа в 15-17 век.
      By hoplit
      Tullio Vidoni. Medieval seamanship under sail. 1987.
      Richard W. Unger. Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe. 1981.
      Dotson J.E. Ship types and fleet composition at Genoa and Venice in the early thirteenth century. 2002.
      John H. Pryor. The naval battles of Roger of Lauria // Journal of Medieval History (1983), 9:3, 179-216
      Lawrence Mott. The Battle of Malta, 1283: Prelude to a Disaster // The Circle of war in the middle ages. 1999. p. 145-172
      Charles D. Stanton. Roger of Lauria (c. 1250-1305): "Admiral of Admirals". 2019
      Mike Carr. Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291–1352. 2015
       
      Oppenheim M. A history of the administration of the royal navy and of merchant shipping in relation to the navy, from MDIX to MDCLX. 1896.
      L. G. C. Laughton. THE SQUARE-TUCK STERN AND THE GUN-DECK. 1961.
      L.G. Carr Laughton. Gunnery,Frigates and the Line of Battle. 1928.
      M.A.J. Palmer. The ‘Military Revolution’ Afloat: The Era of the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the Transition to Modern Warfare at Sea. 1997.
      R. E. J. Weber. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SINGLE LINE AHEAD AS A BATTLE FORMATION BY THE DUTCH 1665 -1666. 1987.
      Kelly De Vries. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FIFTEENTH-CENTURY SHIPBOARD ARTILLERY. 1998.
      Geoffrey Parker. THE DREADNOUGHT REVOLUTION OF TUDOR ENGLAND. 1996.
      A.M. Rodger. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BROADSIDE GUNNERY, 1450–1650. 1996.
      Sardinha Monteiro, Luis Nuno. FERNANDO OLIVEIRA'S ART OF WAR AT SEA (1555). 2015.
      Rudi  Roth. A  proposed standard  in  the reporting  of  historic artillery. 1989.
      Kelly R. DeVries. A 1445 Reference to Shipboard Artillery. 1990.
      J. D. Moody. OLD NAVAL GUN-CARRIAGES. 1952.
      Michael Strachan. SAMPSON'S FIGHT WITH MALTESE GALLEYS, 1628. 1969.
      Randal Gray. Spinola's Galleys in the Narrow Seas 1599–1603. 1978.
      L. V. Mott. SQUARE-RIGGED GREAT GALLEYS OF THE LATE FIFTEENTH CENTURY. 1988.
      Joseph Eliav. Tactics of Sixteenth-century Galley Artillery. 2013.
      John F. Guilmartin. The Earliest Shipboard Gunpowder Ordnance: An Analysis of Its Technical Parameters and Tactical Capabilities. 2007.
      Joseph Eliav. The Gun and Corsia of Early Modern Mediterranean Galleys: Design issues and
      rationales. 2013.
      John F. Guilmartin. The military revolution in warfare at sea during the early modern era:
      technological origins, operational outcomes and strategic consequences. 2011.
      Joe J. Simmons. Replicating Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Ordnance. 1992.
      Ricardo Cerezo Martínez. La táctica naval en el siglo XVI. Introducción y tácticas. 1983.
      Ricardo Cerezo Martínez. La batalla de las Islas Terceras, 1582. 1982.
      Ships and Guns: The Sea Ordnance in Venice and in Europe between the 15th and the 17th Centuries. 2011.
      W. P. Guthrie. Naval Actions of the Thirty Years' War // The Mariner's Mirror, 87:3, 262-280. 2001
      Steven Ashton Walton. The Art of Gunnery in Renaissance England. 1999
       L.G.Carr Laughton & Michael Lewis. Early Tudor Ship Guns // The Mariner's Mirror, 46:4 (1960), 242-285
       
      A. M. Rodger. IMAGE AND REALITY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY NAVAL TACTICS. 2003.
      Brian Tunstall. Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of Fighting Tactics, 1650-1815. 1990.
      Emir Yener. Ottoman Seapower and Naval Technology during Catherine II’s Turkish Wars 1768-1792. 2016.
       
      Боевые парусники уже в конце 15 века довольно похожи на своих потомков века 18. Однако есть "но". "Линейная тактика", ассоциируемая с линкорами 18 века - это не про каракки, галеоны, нао и каравеллы 16 века, она складывается только во второй половине 17 столетия. Небольшая подборка статей и книг, помогающих понять - "что было до".
       
      Ещё пара интересных статей. Не совсем флот и совсем не 15-17 века.
      Gijs A. Rommelse. An early modern naval revolution? The relationship between ‘economic reason of state’ and maritime warfare // Journal for Maritime Research, 13:2, 138-150. 2011.
      N. A.M. Rodger. From the ‘military revolution’ to the ‘fiscal-naval state’ // Journal for Maritime Research, 13:2, 119-128. 2011.
      Morgan Kelly and Cormac Ó Gráda. Speed under Sail during the Early Industrial Revolution (c. 1750–1830) // Economic History Review 72, no. 2 (2019): 459–80.
    • Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо).
      By hoplit
      Просмотреть файл Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо).
      Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо). Раздел "Официальные бумаги". Сс. 279. М.: Восточная литература. 2017.
      Автор hoplit Добавлен 30.04.2020 Категория Корея
    • Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо).
      By hoplit
      Полное собрание документов Ли Сунсина (Ли Чхунму гон чонсо). Раздел "Официальные бумаги". Сс. 279. М.: Восточная литература. 2017.
    • Построения из китайского военного искусства
      By Чжан Гэда
      Прочитал в "Мин цзи наньлюэ" у Цзи Люци:
      Он вообще пишет очень запутанно - похоже, сам не сильно соображал, что писал. Когда он описывал войска Чжэнов - там все очень сумбурно.
      Строй багуа был придуман легендарным Сунь Бинем в IV в. до н.э. и управлялся военачальником, которому делали охраняемую воинами вышку, с которой он подавал команды на перестроения. Система имела возможность 16-ти перестроений. К периоду Тан она трансформировалась в "строй 6 цветков" (люхуа чжэнь), который применял легендарный Ли Цзин во времена Тан:

      Слева люхуачжэнь, справа - багуачжэнь.
      Строй багуа имеет по китайским толкованиями строился на основании этого:

      В строю багуачжэнь имеется "8 врат" - сю (отдых), шэн (жизнь, рождение), шан (ранение, вред), ду (преграда), цзин (благое предзнаменование), сы (смерть), цзин (испуг), кай (раскрытие).
      Прямо на восток располагаются "врата жизни". Если ворваться в них и прорваться через "врата благого предзнаменования" на юго-западе, затем войти во "врата раскрытия" на севере, то можно уничтожить этот строй.
      Вопрос - а зачем такие сложности? Зачем так выеживаться, чтобы сделать простое дело? Вразумительных толкований найти не могу.