hoplit

Мусульманские армии Средних веков

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Hugh Kennedy. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century. 1986

Цитата

The fall of the Umayyads can be explained in many ways. At an ideological level, they failed because they could not offer the sort of leadership which many Muslims wanted. It used to be accepted that the Umayyads claimed only secular authority but recent work by Crone and Hinds has demonstrated that the Umayyad caliphs did claim a religious authority; the ruler was God’s Caliph and had the authority to make decisions about Islamic law and practice. However, there were many Muslims, especially in Iraq, who felt that charismatic, truly Islamic leadership was necessary to establish the rule of the Qur’an and Sunna. By the end of the Umayyad period it had become an article of faith among such people that only the Family of the Prophet could supply this authority.


There were also regional problems. From ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign onwards, Umayyad government had increasingly meant Syrian government. Despite attempts by ‘Umar II and others to broaden the base of the regime, the Muslims of Iraq were entirely excluded. This narrowness of support became even more pronounced with the Qaysc triumph under Marwan II; at the end even Syria and Palestine were conquered territories and Damascus had been replaced by Harran in the Jazcra as the Umayyad capital. This restricted nature of support for the regime was made more serious because neither Syria nor the Jazcra was as rich, or had such large Muslim populations as Iraq. In the second eighth century, the revenues from the alluvial areas of southern Iraq amounted to four times those from Egypt and almost five times the revenues from the whole of Syria and Palestine. Constant warfare had certainly drained the resources of manpower in Syria. The wars of Hisham’s reign against the Berbers and the internecine disputes which followed his death must have placed a considerable strain on the manpower of the Qaysc tribes who supported the last Umayyad. In addition, Marwan’s policies had spread disaffection, not just among elements traditionally hostile to the regime but among people who had previously been loyal servants, like the family of Khalid al-Qasrc and even members of the Umayyad house itself, like Hisham’s own son Sulayman. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Umayyad state was swept away.


In the final judgement, however, it would be wrong to imagine that the fall of the dynasty was inevitable. The Umayyad regime had never been as strong as it had been under Hisham only a decade before the final collapse. It was only the failure of leadership and murderous conflicts which followed his death which led to disaster and even at the end Marwan’s Qaysc supporters could raise very formidable armies to oppose the ‘Abbasids.

 

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Hugh Kennedy. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century. 1986

Цитата

The eastern frontiersmen of Khurasan defeated the men from the Byzantine frontier who supported Marwan but this did not automatically mean the triumph of the ‘Abbasid dynasty. The armies were directed by Abe Muslim and led by Khurasancs who had in many cases no direct contact with the ‘Abbasid family at all; none of the ‘Abbasids had participated in the long march across Iran and the fierce battles against the Umayyad armies of Nubata b. Hanzala and ‘Amir b. Dubara.

Цитата

The proclamation of al-Saffaq as caliph and his acceptance by the Khurasancs and the Kufans only marked the beginning of the establishment of the ‘Abbasids. A number of questions remained to be decided notably whether the ‘Abbasids were to be powerful sovereigns in the way that the Umayyads had been or simply symbolic rulers who would give legitimacy to Khurasanc military rule, and the nature of the relationship between the Khurasanc army and other elements in the Muslim community; in other words would the military dictatorship of the Qayscs simply be replaced by that of the Khurasancs. When al-Saffaq was acknowledged as caliph the answers to these questions were very uncertain and it would be hard to exaggerate the precariousness of the position of the new dynasty. That ‘Abbasid rule was established and accepted by most of the Muslim community was the achievement of the remarkable group of men who formed al-Saffaq’s immediate family and particularly of his own brother Abu Ja‘far, later the Caliph al-Mansur. Al-Saffaq himself only reigned for four years (132–6/749–54) but this period saw the establishment of ‘Abbasid power as it was to remain until after the death of Harun al-Rashid. The caliph himself is sometimes portrayed as a rather nondescript character, even a weakling, and Shaban has argued that he was chosen by the Khurasancs precisely because he was not likely to assert himself. But the historical record suggests a man who was at once cautious and determined and the establishment of the ‘Abbasids owed much to his low-key leadership in the early years.


The key to ‘Abbasid success was to leave eastern Iran in the hands of the Khurasaniyya (the men from Khurasan who had made up the ‘Abbasid army) and Abu Muslim, while establishing members of the ‘Abbasid family as commanders of armies and governors of provinces in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula. As soon as al-Saffaq becamecaliph he sent his uncle ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Alc to lead the armies opposing Marwan on the river Zab, while his brother Abu Ja‘far went to take command of the army besieging the last Umayyad governor of Iraq, Yazcd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra in Wasis. Both ‘Abd Allah and Abu Ja‘far thus acquired a following among the Khurasaniyya in the armies who came to associate their interests with those of their ‘Abbasid leaders. But both men also realized that to rely exclusively on the Khurasaniyya was a recipe for disaster, it would mean that they were little more than puppets in the hands of the military leaders and that they would incur the lasting hostility of all the other groups in the western half of the Islamic world. It would be, in fact, a denial of all the objectives of the revolution. Among the other groups they turned to were of course the Arabs of the Yamami party who had opposed Marwan II. The most famous of these were the Muhallabc family whose influence had survived the fall of Yazcd b. al-Muhallab from political power and who had attempted to take their home town of Basra for the ‘Abbasids at the time of the revolution. The family was now rewarded by governorships, in Basra itself and other areas, notably Ifrcqiya, and they enjoyed a new golden age of prosperity. Also rewarded was the family of another leading figure of the Yamami opposition, Hisham’s long-serving governor of the east, Khalid b. ‘Abd Allah al-Qasri, whose son Muqammad had brought over the town of Kefa to the ‘Abbasid cause and was now rewarded with government appointments, although his family never achieved the eminence of the Muhallabcs.


More striking is the efforts the early ‘Abbasids made to win over the leaders of the Qays. Abu Ja‘far seems to have attempted a compromise with the arch-Qaysc Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra, but was thwarted by Abu Muslim who instructed al-Saffaq to have Yazid executed. Both ‘Abd Allah and Abu Ja‘far did, however, win over many of the Qayscs of the Byzantine and Armenian frontier lands, notably Marwan’s righthand man in the area, Isqaq b. Muslim al-‘Uqaylc, who was to become part of al-Mansur’s inner circle of advisers. Another Qaysc family which survived to enjoy honour and power were the descendants of Qutayba b. Muslim, the conqueror of Bukhara and Samarqand, whose associations with the Umayyad cause did not prevent them being recruited to the ‘Abbasids. One group alone was excluded from this general reconciliation, the members of the Umayyad family itself. All the prominent Umayyads were hunted down and many of them executed by ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Alc when he took over Syria, only one, ‘Abd al-Raqman b. Mu‘awiya, a grandson of the Caliph Hisham, escaping to join supporters in Muslim Spain where he founded a long-lived and successful branch of the dynasty at the western end of the Islamic world.

 

С другой стороны - в конце 820-х частной армии Абу Ишака аль-Мутасима из 3-4 тысяч тюрок окажется достаточно, чтобы прогнуть халифат под себя... =/

Цитата

Al-Mu‘tasim was in many ways a new man himself; one of Harun’s younger sons, he had been given no place in the elaborate succession arrangements his father had worked out and he was only fifteen years old at the outbreak of the civil war. 

...

From 199/814–15 he began to buy slaves in Baghdad from their previous owners and to train them for military service, and both Itakh, a Khazar who had been a cook for his previous owner, and Ashinas were in his service before 202/817–18. He also entered into an arrangement with the Samanid family who controlled much of the Samarqand area and sent him slaves directly from Turkestan. The private army he built up probably only numbered 3,000–4,000 by the end of al-Ma’mun’s reign but they were well trained and disciplined and formed a formidable fighting force.

...

When in 213/828 ‘Abd Allah b. Tahir was appointed governor of Khurasan on the death of his brother
Talqa, al-Mu‘tasim took over all his responsibilities in Syria and Egypt, thus becoming one of the most powerful men in the caliphate. It was this military power, coupled with al-Mu‘tasim’s own forceful and determined personality which induced al-Ma’mun to set aside the claims of his own son al-‘Abbas and to adopt al-Mu‘tasim as his heir. When al-Ma’mun died in 218/833 during a campaign against the Byzantines, his brother was accepted as caliph, not without some murmurings of dissent from those who saw clearly what the new regime would bring.

The new order was based firmly on the army al-Mu‘tasim had built up.

 

В указанный период Багдад (ошметки абна) и Большой Хорасан контролировали Тахириды, одна из опор режима. Потеряют контроль над Хорасаном они как раз в период "Анархии в Самарре" и после нее.

Цитата

It is important to remember, too, that the Tahirids were as powerful in Baghdad as in Khurasan itself and it is probable that the revenues of Khurasan were used to maintain the family’s influence in that city. When ‘Abd Allah b. Tahir had left to take up his position in Khurasan in 213/828 he was succeeded in Baghdad by his cousin Isqaq b. Ibrahim who remained effective ruler of the city until his death over twenty years later in 235/850 after which he was followed by other members of the family. It was this Tahirid control which secured the loyalty of the Baghdadis to the caliphate, especially after al-Mu‘tarim had moved the capital to Samarra, and it was the Tahirids who suppressed the only real disturbance in the city during these years, the conspiracy of Aqmad b. Nasr al-Khuza‘i in 231/846. One of the main reasons for the civil war had been the desire of the abna under ‘Ali b. ‘Isa to have access to the tax revenues of Khurasan; now, under Tahirid patronage, their children had just that. Baghdad could prove useful to the caliphs as a rival source of power to Samarra with its Turkish population; when al-Mutawakkil wished to dispose of the Turk Itakh in 235/849 he arranged that the execution should be carried out by the Tahirids in Baghdad, safely away from Itakh’s followers in Samarra.

 

Цитата

By 335/946 the three sons of Buya had established themselves in effective control of Fars, Iraq and Rayy, and their descendants were able to maintain themselves in most of those areas until the coming of the Seljuks, a century later. The history of the Buyid period is very confused and full of marches, battles and succession disputes which seem both ephemeral and pointless. The historian’s task is complicated by the fact that there were at least three and sometimes more centres of activity which were at the same time closely interconnected. This means that the narrative thread is thoroughly tangled and the position is made more difficult by the fact that the sources are very uneven. It is clear that Fars was the most important province of the Buyid confederation but the narratives on which we depend are largely based on Baghdad material and show almost no concern for events in Fars at all, while on the other hand we are very well informed about Iraqi affairs which were in some ways marginal to Buyid history. None the less, events in Baghdad are of great interest for social and cultural reasons, since it was in Baghdad at this time that the doctrinal positions of imami Shi‘ism and Sunnc Islam were worked out. Baghdad then, attracts more attention than its purely political importance would warrant.

Buyid history can be chronologically divided, roughly, into two divisions. The first half-century, up to the death of ‘Adud al-Dawla, greatest of the Buyid rulers, in 372/983, is one of growth and consolidation when the political initiative was firmly in the hands of the princes of the ruling dynasty. From that point, however, the Buyids were on the defensive, especially in Iraq and central Iran, and political initiative passed to the hands of groups of soldiers and administrators who strove to manipulate their nominal rulers in their own interests.

Опять "великая держава одного четырех двух человек". Али ибн Буя Имад аль-Даула с двумя братьями создал державу ("конфедерацию") Буидов, воспользовавшись прогрессирующим кризисом Аббасидов. Его племянник Хосров (!) Адуд аль-Даула - пик силы Буидов. И все. 

С другой стороны - "золотой век" Омейядов-Марванидов и Аббасидов это тоже недлинные цепочки из 3-4 правителей...

Цитата

The Buyid lands formed a federation, rather than an empire. The major political units were the principalities centred on Fars, with its capital at Shiraz, al-Jibal, based on Rayy, and Iraq, including Baghdad, Basra and, very briefly, Mosul. 

...

One of the main sources of the intermittent conflicts which mark the history of the period was the question of succession to the various principalities. The possessions of the family were always considered as the property of the whole group, rather than of individual branches, and relatives felt that they had the right, even the duty, to interfere in times of trouble, as when ‘Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiyar seemed unable to administer Iraq effectively in 367/978 and his cousin ‘Adud al-Dawla stepped in to restore family rule in the area. Despite this family solidarity, the Buyids never developed an ordered system of inheritance; as in eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe each powerful ruler sought to provide a suitable inheritance for all his sons, even if it had to be done at the expense of his cousins. Correspondingly, all Buyid princes could feel entitled to a share of the patrimony and this right was even claimed by some, like Ibn Kakeya, who secured the independence of Isfahan in the early fifth/eleventh century, who were only related to the Buyid family by marriage.


The complex nature of family ties and obligations provided enough scope for conflict within the dynasty but there were other points of friction as well. One such was the question of succession to the title of shahanshah, effectively the presidency of the confederation. The powers this title conferred were not extensive; it was more a recognition of seniority within the family than an office with authority, rather like the title of grand prince of Kiev in twelfth-century Russia. From the beginning there was no idea that the title was hereditary, or that it was attached to any particular principality

 

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Занятно, насколько Иран, на самом деле ... маленький. Есть "кусочек Месопотамии" в виде Элама/Хузестана/Арабистана. Есть Табаристан/Мазендеран между Каспием и Эльбурсом. Есть восточное Закавказье в виде Азербайджана. И все. Остальная часть страны - это несколько небольших оазисов. 

Тот же сельскохозяйственный очаг у Персеполя на реке Кор - пара тысяч квадратных километров. Река Кор впадает в соленое озеро Бахтеган. Рядом - Шираз в оазисе на пересыхающей реке Рудхане Хошк. Исфахан - на реке Зайендерун, которая впадет в соленое озеро Гавхуни. Тебриз - на реке Кури, впадающей в соленое озеро Урмия. И еще один сельскохозяйственный очаг к югу от озера (с Миандоабом). Сельскохозяйственные очаг у подножия Эльбурса от Рея до Казвина (там сейчас и Тегеран стоит) утыкается с юга прямо в каменистую пустыню Деште-Кавир.

 

В Хорасане - не лучше. Мешхед и Нишапур расположены у подножия горы Биналуд, с двух сторон от нее. Мерв, Балх, Герат - сравнительно небольшие оазисы посреди нагромождения полупустынь, пустынь и гор.

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Eberhard W. Sauer, Jebrael Nokandeh, Konstantin Pitskhelauri and Hamid Omrani Rekavandi. Innovation and Stagnation: Military Infrastructure and the Shifting Balance of Power Between Rome and Persia // Sasanian Persia. Between Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia. Edited by Eberhard W. Sauer. 2017

Operativnaya_sistema_Sasanidov.thumb.jpg

Занятно, кстати, выходит. Qal`eh Gabri - это сельскохозяйственный очаг Казвин-Рей. Насколько понимаю - это в принципе "всеиранский перекресток". Leilan - отмечен в районе оазиса к югу от Урмии. Укрепления на реке Горган - запирают "восточные ворота" в Табаристан. Дербент - "замок" на дороге в Закавказье.

 

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Обычно по изогиете в 200 мм осадков в год проводят границу регионов, пригодных для земледелия. Хотя и там бывают нюансы - наличие подземных водоносных пластов, реки и т.д.

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Matthew King. The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Medieval Mediterranean. 2018

Robert Ignatius Burns. Renegades, Adventurers, and Sharp Businessmen: The Thirteenth-Century Spaniard in the Cause of Islam // The Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Oct., 1972), pp. 341-366

Цитата

Most distinguished of the Almoravid Christian generals was the invincible Berengar (ibn) Reverter, viscount of Barcelona, who stemmed the Almohad advance for the caliph 'Ali; after his last battle in 1142 the Almohads crucified his corpse. One son abandoned an African military career to die as a Templar in 1207; his brother, the apostate Abu 'l-Hasan, served the Almohads until his death in battle in 1186.

 

J. John. Malik Ifriqiya: The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Fatimids // Libyan Studies. Volume: 18. Pages: 89-101. 1987

David Abulafia. The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Norman Expeditions to Majorca and the Muslim Mediterranean // Anglo-Norman Studies VII: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 1984: 26–49. 1985

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Roger Collins. Caliphs and Kings Spain, 796–1031. 2012

Цитата

In recent years, to bring up the Umayyad period in Spanish history in casual conversation with friends, colleagues, and complete strangers often raises the issue of whether this was indeed that golden age of tolerance in which members of the three Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam coexisted in harmony and mutual respect. To which question there can be but one quick answer, and that is a wholly negative one. If a fuller or more nuanced reply is required, then it would involve saying that if there were any truth in such a notion then it only applied for a very limited period of forty years or fewer in the mid-tenth century, in just one location, the city of Córdoba, and to a very small sector of society, the intellectual elite attached to the caliphal court. Beyond these chronological, geographical, and social confines, life in Umayyad al-Andalus as recorded in our far from insubstantial sources looks more like Thomas Hobbes’s war of all against all than a realization of the prophetic vision of the wolf dwelling with the lamb, and the lion lying down with the goat.

Цитата

However, in the late 1980s, when it was first published, that tradition had yet to come to terms with the idea that these sources, all dating to the tenth century or there after, were not objective reports of the events of the early eighth century that just needed to have their narratives rationalized, despite fundamental divergences between them, so as to provide a seamless account of the events and personalities of that period.

 

Насколько понял - Андалус с момента своего формирования и далее на протяжении двух веков был в состоянии "неспокойствия". Там постоянно "тянуло дымом" и периодически "бабахало". И то, что в конце 9 века эмират рассыпался - результат, возможно, не того, что "бахать" стало чаще или сильнее, а того, что конкретный правитель в "обычных условиях" действовал не так успешно, как его предшественники.

Цитата

Such expeditions could therefore be legitimately directed against those within al-Andalus who were resisting the ruler’s authority. They became the principal way in which his power could be expressed in the frontier territories, and this was often more of a primary purpose than the chastisement of unbelievers outwith al-Andalus. However, for these expeditions to be effective they depended on the tax receipts and military contributions that the frontier marches would be expected to make. The more numerous and geographically widespread the rejections of the Umayyads’ authority, the more difficult it became for them to reimpose it. Facing resistance in several different regions made it all the more important that it be effectively repressed in each of them in turn, as happened under ‘Abdal-Rahman II. In the reign of Muhammad I, however, we see a succession of partial and incomplete solutions, with the geographical focus of campaigns shifting from year to year, rebels being defeated but left still active and able to reestablish themselves. When a new focus of rebellion emerged in the south, in the region of Málaga, at the very end of the reign, military resources were just stretched even further, and the cycle of the ineffectual attempts at the repression of opposition became even wider. Following al-Mundhir’s failure to crush Ibn Hafsun in 888 a full-blown crisis nearly overwhelmed the Umayyad dynasty.

Вообще, насколько понимаю, в современной исторической литературе это довольно распространенный подход. К примеру - Simon MacLean. Kingship and Politics in the Late Ninth Century. Charles the Fat and the End of the Carolingian Empire. Не "подъем [нужное вписать] сил", а "династический кризис". Сначала Карл Толстый не совладал с обстановкой, потом Арнульф заигрался - и понеслось. Если бы Арнульф, банально, преуспел в изображении себя "природным Каролингом" - весь расклад мог изрядно поменяться.

 

Цитата

In some ways the situation around 1013 was very similar to that encountered almost exactly one hundred years earlier, with al-Andalus divided up into a set of territories whose rulers either ignored or were in active conflict both with their neighbors and with the former central authority, the Umayyad realm. In both periods these local regimes were created by the men who controlled the military muscle that gave them the power, if not the legitimacy, to do so. Many of them were probably economically better fortheir inhabitants than the Umayyad rule they replaced, as all of the taxes (mainly but not exclusively from the non-Muslim population) and profits of trade otherwise tended to flow mono-directionally towards Córdoba where they benefitted the monarchs, their courtiers and favorites, and even some of its citizenry, but gave no corresponding returns to the inhabitants of the frontier marches and the other districts of al-Andalus. Tenth-century Córdoba can be seen as a bloated fungal growth created in the first instance by ‘Abd al-Rahman III as an unintended consequence of his way of dealing with the decline of Umayyad authority in preceding decades. A century later, the Ta’ifa kingdoms were a similar response to the weakening of central power, but this time there was no center left to try to regain control of the periphery: it had been smashed irreparably in the events that unfolded in and around Córdoba from 1008 to 1013.

 

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Hugh Kennedy. Muslim Spain and Portugal A Political History of al-Andalus. 1996

Цитата

Our understanding of the Muslim conquest of al-Andalus and the establishment of Arab rule is hampered by the nature of the sources. No contemporary Arabic accounts of the conquest survive and the earliest major sources which have been passed down to us are collections of historical anecdotes (akhbar) preserved in a number of works dating from the tenth century onwards, notably the anonymous Akhbar al-Majmua (Collection of Anecdotes) from possibly c. 940 and the Tarikh Iftitah al-Andalus (History of the Conquest of al-Andalus) of Ibn al-Qutiya (d. 977). Both these collections arrange their materials more or less in chronological order but they are not annals and are more concerned with vivid and interesting stories than the careful ordering of events. The Akhbar is particularly important for the pre-Umayyad period, while Ibn al-Qutiya gives vivid and gossipy accounts of the courts of the Umayyad amirs.


In the tenth century these accounts were edited and systematised using the criteria of annalistic historiography developed in the eastern Islamic world by such authorities as al-Mada’ini (d. 839) and al-Tabari (d. 923). In al-Andalus this editing seems to have been the work of the RazI family, originally from Rayy in central Iran, who had come to al-Andalus as merchants in the late ninth century. According to his son ‘Isa (d. 989), it was Ahmad b. Musa al-RazI (d. 955) who took the akhbar which people in al-Andalus had not previously been very interested in and ordered them (dawwana) according to the rules of historical science. The writings of the Razis, father and son, have largely been lost but they were used, and often incorporated entirely, with acknowledgements, by the great eleventh-century compiler Ibn Hayyan (d. 1076). Much of Ibn Hayyan’s work has in turn been lost, including the sections which dealt with the conquests and the early amirs. Some of his material has, however, been preserved in shorter works, like the anonymous Path al-Andalus of c. 1100, and later abbreviated recensions in annalistic compilations like Ibn Idhari's Bayan al-Maghrib of about 1300.


The fact that the sources as they have reached us were written down at least two centuries after the events has meant that fierce controversy has raged about the relative merits and reliability of these sources. Opinions have varied between historians like Taha, on the one hand, who accept the Arabic narratives almost completely, and Collins, who holds that the Arabic tradition is virtually worthless.

It is important to attempt to assess the reliability of this material. Clearly these Arab histories are biased in the sense that they are in favour of Muslim victories and claimed that these were the result of God’s support, but this sort of open partisanship does not present real problems to the modern historian. There are, however, a variety of other ways in which the material needs to be treated with caution.


There is material which is clearly legendary or folkloric, like the story of the locked chamber in Toledo which King Roderick was rash enough to open, only to find that the interior was covered by paintings of Arab warriors, and, probably, the story of Count Julian and the rape of his daughter by King Roderick. These stories, with their obvious predictive and entertaining functions, are unlikely to mislead historians. The use of topoi and conventional phrases, expressions and characterisation borrowed from eastern Islamic sources may also give a false impression of detailed accuracy.


There may also have been more hard-headed reasons for being economical with the truth. The nature of the conquest affected the status of the lands conquered: if they were conquered by force ('anwatan) they became the property of the conquerors, the indivisible fay' (immovable booty) of the Muslims, and the proceeds from these properties were to be used for the benefit of the Muslims as their ruler saw fit. If the lands were taken peacefully (sulhan), on the other hand, they continued to be the absolute property of the inhabitants and would only pass into Muslim hands by inheritance, purchase or conversion of the owner, in which case they would be the absolute property of their Muslim owners. There is some evidence of two historiographical traditions within the accounts of the conquests. The first, reported by the Razls and other sources close to the Umayyad court, emphasises the forceful nature of the conquest, since conquest by force would give the Umayyads the right to dispose of the lands, whereas other accounts talk of take-over by agreement and so emphasise the rights of the owners. This may account for disagreements in the sources about the nature of the conquest, and such details as the fall of Seville, which is said to have surrendered peacefully and then rebelled and had to be subdued by force, may be explained as attempts to conflate two contradictory traditions. In the end, however, it must be admitted that these divisions of opinion could simply be the result of genuine confusion over events which happened long ago.

С другой стороны 

Цитата

The fact that these sources, in the form in which they have been handed down to us, are much later need not undermine their credibility. The Arabic historical tradition laid great emphasis on preserving the wording and forms of old accounts and much of the work of compilers like Ibn Hayyan was basically editing and republishing older materials, rather than composing a new account. Later chronicles can contain important nuggets of information which survive from much earlier times: the most important account of the nature of the settlement of the Syrian junds in al-Andalus after 741, for example, is found in fragments of al-Razi embedded in the late fourteenth-century Ihata of Ibn al-Khatlb, composed in its present form 650 years after the events it describes.

То есть - переработка и переделка более ранних материалов для арабской исторической традиции нехарактерна. И если текст ссылается на более раннюю работу - с высокой вероятностью он скопирован оттуда с высокой степенью точности.

 

Цитата

There is little evidence about the working of the jund system in the Umayyad period. The only account we have is a report from Ahmad al-Razi (d. 955) who explains that the Syrian jundis, whose names were recorded in a diwan, were divided into two groups, one which went on campaign and the other which stayed at home. After three months the two groups would change places. Those on campaign were paid a rizq of 5 dinars at the end of the campaign while their chiefs received 200. The baladis had no diwan and only their leaders were paid 100 dinars. The Syrians were exempt from the 'ushr (tithe) and only had to pay a share of the revenues they collected from the non-Muslims; the baladis, by contrast, were obliged to pay this tithe.

Цитата

But in many ways the strength of the state was dependent on the personality of the monarch; for all the wealth and culture of Cordoba, deep regional and social divisions remained and might easily reappear in response to feebleness or disturbances at the capital.

 

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Hugh Kennedy. Muslim Spain and Portugal A Political History of al-Andalus. 1996

Цитата

A surviving passage of Ibn Hayyan’s account of the reign7 gives details of the recruitment of horsemen for the sa’ifa of 863. The name of each kura (district) is given with the number of men provided:

Elvira, 2,700
Jaen, 2,200
Cabra, 1,800
Priego (Baghu), 900
Takuranna (the Ronda district), 299
Algeciras, 290
Ecija, 1,200
Carmona, 180
Sidonia, 6,790
Rayyu (the Malaga area), 2,600
Fahs al-Ballut (Pedroche, north of Cordoba), 400
Moron, 1,400
Tudmir, 156
(?) Reina (north-west of Cordoba), 106
Calatrava and Oreto, 387

There was also an unknown number from Cordoba. Ibn Hayyan explains that this was after the obligation to go on the sa’ifa was removed from Cordoba and some other places. Ibn al-Qutiya8 relates a story in which ‘Isa b. Shuhayd goes to Seville, not mentioned in the list, to levy troops for the jihad. The list is interesting, but it presents a number of puzzles. It is clear that the amirs were heavily dependent on Andalucia for military recruitment: the small contingent from Tudmir (Murcia) are the only outsiders listed. There are none from north of Calatrava or west of Seville. These are precisely the areas in which the Syrian junds had been settled after 741. The army was assembled specifically for the jihad and the amirs probably had to rely on the full-time hashm army of professionals for campaigns within al-Andalus: only when they faced the infidel could the amirs command such widespread support. The differences between the contributions are very surprising: there seems no obvious reason why Sidonia should have supplied so many more than Elvira or Rayyu, or why Ecija should have contributed seven times as many as neighbouring Carmona. It looks in fact much more like a list of volunteers than an organised levy and, as Ibn Hayyan says of the Cordobans, ‘they were each able to decide for themselves whether to volunteer for the jihad without any compulsion’.9 In the short term, the move to make military service among the jund voluntary greatly increased Muhammad’s popularity, but the long-term effects may have been less beneficial: if this hypothesis is correct, then it marks an important stage in the demilitarisation of the native Andalusi population which was to be such an important, and ultimately disastrous, feature of the tenth- and eleventh-century history of al-Andalus.

Цитата

7. Quoted in Ibn Idhari, Al-Bayan, ii, p. 109.

 

Цитата

Credit for the survival of Umayyad rule despite these assaults should go, not to the torpid Amir himself but to a small band of dedicated Umayyad mawali and some members of the Umayyad family. The key figure among them was Ahmad b. Abl ‘Abda, whose family had long connections with the Umayyad family. He, and his sons ‘Isa and ‘Abbas, were indefatigable leaders of military expeditions to drive back rebels and to collect taxes. He collected a small group of soldiers, only 300 strong, but they were said to have been the equal of any army in al-Andalus. Virtually every year, usually under the formal leadership of one of the Amir’s sons, Aban or al-‘Asi, the Banu Abi ‘Abda would set out to do battle.


A typical expedition is described by Ibn Hayyan in the year 896. The small army, commanded by the Amir’s uncle Hisham b. ‘Abd al-Rahman and Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Abi ‘Abda, left Cordoba at the end of Rabi I (17 May) when the harvest would be beginning. They pursued a very winding route through the mountains east of Jaen to Guadix. At first they headed south to Hisn Qamarat Jaysh (an unidentified site on the river Guadalbullon near to Jaen controlled by Ibn Hudhayl) where they set about ravaging the agricultural lands and cutting down the trees until Ibn Hudhayl appeared to do batte. After some inconclusive fighting Ibn Hudhayl asked for peace and it was agreed on condition that his father was sent as a hostage to Cordoba. They then moved on to Bakhtwira (unidentified) in the lands of another war-lord, Hurayz b. Habil, where the horses were allowed to graze in the crops and inflicted considerable damage. After that they went to Baeza (at this time loyal to the government) where they collected the ‘ushur. They stayed there for three days during which time the troops went off to Tashkar (Castillo de Tiscar) which they found deserted so they burned it and took the harvest.


By this time the weather had worsened dramatically and, despite the fact that it was high summer, the army was drenched and demoralised by continuous torrential rain. They returned to Bakhtwira, stronghold of Hurayz b. Habil. After some fierce fighting they drove him out of the suburb, which they burned, and into the castle. From here he negotiated peace on the condition that he handed over his son as a hostage and agreed to pay 2,500 dinars in cash and compensation for eight military horses which had been hamstrung in the fighting. He was given a written agreement (aman). The bedraggled expedition (it was still raining hard, with thunder and lightning) pushed on, stopping at Munt Shaqir (Montejicar), Al-Banyul (Albuniel) and Hisn al-Liqun (Alicun de Ortega) which they quickly captured and where they took horses, equipment and a lot of food; they ejected the partisans of Ibn Hudhayl from the fortress and installed a garrison of Arabs and Berbers. At Guadix they paused for a few days to receive the caravan bringing the tithes (‘ushur) from Pechina and the taxes (jibdya) of Hisn Bashira before crossing the border into the province of Tudmir (Murcia) to Balsh (Velez Rubio). The weather was still as bad but they persevered, fighting the locals and destroying houses and fruit trees until, in August, they reached the River Segura where they first came into conflict with the supporters of Daysam b. Ishaq. When they finally reached Murcia they stayed there for ten days collecting the taxes (magharim) from the people.


At the beginning of Rajab (26 August) they set off on the return journey. It was not easy. Having been drenched on the way, they now suffered from terrible thirst and some 30 men and numerous animals perished. Daysam himself was at Lorca, but they passed the city and made no effort to take it. Daysam pursued them and there was some skirmishing in which the Cordoba forces took horses and seven coats of mail. Then they returned via Jaen to Cordoba, reaching the capital three months and 21 days after setting out.

The long account throws very interesting light on the government in ‘Abd Allah’s reign. It is quite clear that the systematic taxation and administration had almost completely broken down. It is true that taxes were collected from Pechina and in Murcia but, at least in Murcia, this only happened because the army visited. In addition to the money, the expedition was concerned to secure supplies of food, horses and military equipment, presumably to see it through the winter in Cordoba as well as for the expedition. The Cordoba forces could extract hostages from lesser war-lords, but, faced with Daysam at Lorca, they could not even attempt to reduce him to obedience. Basically, this was government by pillage and the Umayyad army was no more than a marauding band living off the country: its main objective was not to uphold the authority of the state, but simply to feed itself. This was the reality of power when ‘Abd al-Rahman III became amir.

 

Цитата

It is impossible to tell how many Lamtuna and other Berber supporters of the Almoravids actually setded in al-Andalus. Estimates of their numbers at the battle of Zallaqa vary wildly, but may have lain between the 12,000 suggested by Ibn Kardabus and the 20,000 of‘Abd al-Wahid al-Marrakushi. In 495/1101-2 Ibn Tashfin instructed his son to maintain (tarakab) 17,000 horsemen in al-Andalus: 4,000 in Seville, 1,000 in Cordoba, 1,000 in Granada, 4,000 in the Levante and the remainder (7,000) distributed along the frontiers. This accords well with the 4,000 troops Ibn Tashfin despatched to the Levante at the time of the siege of Aledo35. It is true these numbers refer to horsemen and there may have been large numbers of foot soldiers to accompany them, but if so, their presence has passed unremarked by the sources. These are not large numbers in themselves. Furthermore, there is no evidence of tribal immigration or of large-scale settlement. At the time of the anti-Almoravid movements in the 1140s, small numbers of identifiable Almoravids in provincial towns were hunted down and killed, implying a dispersed settlement and the preservation of a separate identity. The Almoravid presence was essentially military and essentially urban.

Цитата

35. See Hulul al-Mawshlya, p. 57; Lagardere, Le Vendredi de Zallaqa, p. 44.

 

Цитата

Why then did Muslim political society fail?

Some of the answers to this question are unknowable given the information at our disposal. There may have been demographic factors: the Christian population may have grown faster than the Muslim for some reason, and simple Malthusian pressures forced them to conquer new lands. Yet there is no evidence for this, and in many areas the Christian setders of reconquered lands were few and not sufficiently numerous to occupy the countryside. 

...

Muslim disunity was a major cause of weakness. Immediately after the death of al-Muzaffar in 1008, different factions began to search for Christian allies and the pattern continued. The Taifa kings of Zaragoza and Toledo sought, and paid heavily for, Christian allies, Ibn Mardanish in the twelfth century depended on Christian support to sustain his independence in the face of Almohad advance, and Ibn al-Ahmar in the 1240s owed much of his rise to power to his position as a vassal and ally of the Castilian king. Muslim political disunity inevitably resulted in Christian military advance.

But this can only be part of the answer. Christian Spain too was torn by feuds: brothers fought over succession, the kings of Castile and Aragon struggled for supremacy in the border regions and the kings of Leon in the second half of the twelfth century were happy to accept the Almohads as allies against their cousins in Castile and Portugal. Yet Christian disunity did not have the same catastrophic consequences and Christians did not allow Muslim princes to fight their battles. The Taifa kings of Zaragoza and Toledo in the eleventh century did invite Christian troops into their enemies’ lands. Alfonso VI may have taken refuge in Muslim Toledo but he never employed the armies of Toledo to ravage the lands of his brother Sancho. The struggle between the kings of Castile and Leon after 1157 was as fierce as any conflict with the Muslims, but neither side invited Almohad armies into their lands.

...

Siege warfare was another area of Muslim military weakness. After 1000, if the Christians captured a town or city, they held it. There are a few exceptions, like Valencia in 1102 and Almeria in 1157, but both of these were isolated outposts. Despite victories on the field of battle, the Muslims were never able to mount an effective siege of Toledo. When Lisbon fell in 1147 or Cuenca in 1177, they were never subsequently threatened by Muslim armies. When the Almohads attempted the siege of even a small town like Huete, the result was a fiasco. This was not because Muslims in general were unable to mount sieges: the Mamlukes of Egypt were superbly effective in this branch of warfare. What we can say with confidence is that the Muslims of al-Andalus seem to have been unable to take well-fortified and defended cities.

As early as the tenth century, the eastern geographer Ibn Hawqal had noted the unwillingness of native Andalusis to become soldiers. The military reforms of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nasir and al-Mansur institutionalised the exclusion of most Andalusis from the army. The Taifa kings failed to recruit effective armies locally and the coming of the Almoravids meant that the defence of the country was entrusted to Berbers. This exclusion was never complete and there were always examples of Andalusi soldiers, like the Tujibis under al-Mansur and the Banu ‘Azzun and Banu Wazir under the Almohads, who did play an important, if secondary, military role, but they were exceptional.


This meant that there was a large non-military, civilian population in al-Andalus, untrained in warfare and unequipped. They relied on the professional soldiers to defend them and when, with the collapse of the caliphate, the Almoravids or the Almohads, these professional soldiers were no longer available, the local people could not mount a successful resistance. Along with this concentration of military power in a caste of professional solders went the concentration of political power in the hands of the rulers. Under the Umayyads, the lords of the Marches had considerable autonomy and the power to lead defensive and offensive campaigns on their own initiative. Under the Almoravids and Almohads, such local initiatives ceased to be possible. This is especially true under the centralised Almohad caliphate when the prolonged absences of the caliphs effectively paralysed both offensive and defensive war efforts.


Christian Spain and Portugal during this period have been described as a ‘society organised for war’. The Christians seem to have been able to mobilise a much higher proportion of their populations for warfare, in royal armies, in the armies of the military orders and in the armies of the towns. The gulf between the military castes and the rest of the population did not exist. Furthermore, there were many different centres of command. Not only were there three or four frontier monarchies but there were military orders, nobles’ followings and town armies with their own command structure, capable of independent action. Muslim society had no equivalent of an adventurer like Giraldo Sempavor or military forces like the aggressive and effective militia of Avila in the second half of the twelfth century. If royal power was enfeebled by minority or civil war, as in Castile after 1157, there were others who could and did assume a leadership role.

...

In the end, it is probably impossible to tell how far these various factors, demography, military technology and military and political structures, led to the demise of al-Andalus. But it remains a central and intriguing question why the self-confident and dominant Muslim political society of the year 1000 should have divided, shrunk and, eventually, half a millennium later, disappeared from Iberian soil completely.

 

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Baybars’ Successors. Ibn al-Furāt on Qalāwūn and al-Ashraf. Translated by David Cook. 2020.

Ibn al-Furāt (1334-1405).

Боевые порядки мамлюков перед второй битвой при Хомсе (1281).

Цитата

The Muslims spent the night on the backs of their horses, and at daybreak on Thursday 14 Rajab [October 29, 1281] which was the battle day, al-Malik al-Manṣūr rode and arranged the victorious Islamic armies in accord with what we will describe citing what the emir Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-dawādār al-Manṣūrī from his work Zubdat al-fikra fi tā’rīkh al-hijra.

This was that the victorious right flank contained al-Malik al-Manṣūr, ruler of Ḥamāh, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baysarā al-Shamsī, the emir `Alā’ al-Dīn Kushtghadī al-Shamsī, and their auxiliaries. In the right flank vanguard there was the emir Sharaf al-Dīn `Īsā b. Muhannā, [the tribes of] Āl Faḍl, Āl Murrā, the Bedouin of Syria, and those who were attached to them.


The blessed left flank contained the emir Shams al-Dīn Sunqur al-ashqar, and those emirs with him, the emir Badr al-Dīn Bīlīk al-Aydimurī, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baktāsh, amīr silāḥ (armorer), the emir `Alam al-Dīn Sanjar al-Ḥalabī, the emir [Badr] al-Dīn Bajkā al-`Alā’ī, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baktūt al-`Alā’ī, the emir Sayf al-Dīn Jabrak al-Tatarī, and those auxiliaries with them. In left flank vanguard were the Turkmen massed, the army of Ḥiṣn al-Akrād and al-Jālīsh.


The center contained the emir Ḥusām al-Dīn Țurunṭāy, the deputy sultan in the Egyptian homelands, with his auxiliaries, the emir Rukn al-Dīn Ayājī the chamberlain, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baktāsh son of Karmūn, together with the royal mamluks with them. The Sultan al-Malik al-Manṣūr waited underneath the victorious standards, while surrounded by his mamluks, dependents, and officials.

...

As for the Islamic left flank, the Tatars’ right clashed with it, but the former did not hold firm because of their squadrons following one after another, so it was defeated and those in it retreated. The same with the left wing of the center, so the Tatars followed behind the retreating Muslims until they came under Ḥimṣ, whose gates were locked.

 

Р. Амитаи-Прейсс сделал несколько пометок к переводу сведений аль-Фурата у Мартинеса. Проблема в том, что в переводе Кука я даже их хвостов не вижу. Кроме этого - Кук не привел подстрочника для военных терминов, а про другим примерам - в таких узких вопросах я ему не сильно доверяю. Он может дать "свое понимание" вместо максимально точной передачи текста оригинала. Для примера

Цитата

He dispatched a number of the local garrisons from Upper Egypt, and the road guard (qarāghulāmiyya), and dispatched the emir `Izz al-Dīn Aydimur al-Sayfī al-silāḥdār, who was appointed governor over the Qūṣ an districts with his provisions, in addition to the royal mamluks stationed in the Qūṣ an districts, the local troops in Qūṣ , and the Bedouin of that region.

0_0???? Этот же именно эпизод вот тут.

2.thumb.png.15f5584342790ff923f7403c40ba

Примечание Гибба. In any case qaraghulam is not to be confused with the later Mongol term qaraghul ...

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А попутал он кара-гулямов с монгольским "караулом". =/

Цитата

The Mongols maintained some type of formation called qaraghul, which combined the function of frontier guards and highway patrol, but little is known of its actual structure and numbers.

Цитата

mongol qara'ulqaraghul «garde, sentinelle, patrouille» (qui est passé sous les formes qaravul en čaghatay et qaraqol ou qaraghol en osmanli)

 

Ранее у него было такое вот

Цитата

They mustered at the field to enter Damascus with the vanguard (aṭlāb) and the arrangement as usual.

Но atlab это множественное от tulb, при чем тут vanguard?

 

Схема построения мамлюков у Р. Амитаи-Прейсс на базе пачки источников.

izobrazhenie_2021-02-02_005303.thumb.png

 

В принципе - словом "vanguard" Кук мог передать термин, использующийся в оригинале для обозначения крайних фланговых полков...

Цитата

Tuhfa, 99-100; Zubda, fols. 113b-l 14a; whence Nuwayii, MS. 2n, fol. 8a-b (cites Baybars al-Mansuri by name); Ibn al-Furat, 7:215 (also names Baybars's Zubda as source); Maqrizi, 1:692-3; Dhahabl, MS. Laud. 279, fol. 65b (= MS. Aya Sofya 3014, fol. 98a), also gives most of this information, albeit in a different fashion. Martinez, "Il-Xanid army," 161-2, analyzes some parts of Ibn al-Furat's rendition of Baybars al-Mansuri's passage, but makes several mistakes: first, there is no justification for reading instead of jalish the word jawish, which he understands to be "sargeant" [sic]. In the Mamluk armies there was nothing resembling a "battalion of sargeants." The term jalish is frequently found, makes perfect sense here, and is clearly read, in both Baybars al-Mansuri and Ibn al-Furat. On p. 165, Martinez must be referring to these so-called "sargeants" when he writes that the Mamluk Center had a "screen of infantry." This last statement is completely unjustified. Secondly, there is no basis for the statement that the troops of Hisn al-Akrad "were apparently similar to the Turcomans and hence made up of Kurds as the place name implies." The name of the fort had nothing to do with its garrison. Thirdly, cIsa b. Muhanna (head of the curban, not carban as written), was not present at the next battle of Homs in AH 1299, since he died in 683/1284; rather his son, Muhanna b. cIsa, was there.

И вот есть у меня подозрение, что 

Цитата

The center contained the emir Ḥusām al-Dīn Țurunṭāy, the deputy sultan in the Egyptian homelands, with his auxiliaries, the emir Rukn al-Dīn Ayājī the chamberlain, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baktāsh son of Karmūn, together with the royal mamluks with them. The Sultan al-Malik al-Manṣūr waited underneath the victorious standards, while surrounded by his mamluks, dependents, and officials.

то ли victorious standards, то ли auxiliaries могут оказаться в оригинале как раз "jalish". Скорее первое, но не исключаю и второе. 

Вроде бы и перевод свежий - но толком ничего не дает. Все равно надо термины по оригиналу смотреть. =( 

 

Еще из перевода Кука. Армия монголов.

Цитата

We had mentioned that Shams al-Dīn Sunqur al-ashqar and the emir Sharaf al-Dīn `Īsā b. Muhannā both wrote to the king Abagha son of Hűlegű, the king of the Tatars, concerning the dissension that had occurred between the Muslims’ armies, so when what they wrote him reached him, he prepared armies, and they set out towards the Syrian lands.

These divided into three divisions: one division (headed) towards the [Seljuq] Rūm, whose commanders were Ṣamghār, Tanjī, and Țaranjī. One division towards the east, whose commander was Baidu son of Țarghāy son of Hűlegű — it was accompanied by the ruler of Mārdīn. The third division that had most of the army, and the bulk of the Mongols, accompanied by Mengű Teműr son of Hűlegű.

Цитата

All this time the Muslims’ army was at the ready outside of Ḥimṣ, and the report came that Mengű Teműr was at Ḥamāh leading the Tatars’ armies of 80,000, among them 50,000 Mongols. The rest were apostates (murtadda), Georgians, Rūm [Seljuqs], Armenians and Franks.

Цитата

Write this very hour to the Sultan, on a bird’s wing, and make him aware that the group is 80,000 fighters in the center, among them 44,000 Mongols. They will advance to the center, while their right flank is very strong, so strengthen the left flanks of the Muslims, and guard the standards.

Цитата

The Tatars’ squadrons appeared, and it was said that the number of the Tatars was 100,000 horsemen, or more, while the Muslims’ army was half of that or less. 

По аль-Фурату, значительная часть армии "татар" состояла из местных контингентов. Что характерно - как-то не особо попадаются на глаза работы с разбором, как они предметно взаимодействовали на поле боя. =/

izobrazhenie_2021-02-02_013215.thumb.png

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Chronicles of Qalāwūn and his son al-Ashraf Khalīl. Translated by David Cook. 2020

Baybars al-ManṣūrīZubdat al-fikra fi tā’rīkh al-hijra. Как раз на эту работу выше ссылается аль-Фурат.

Цитата

The Muslims were glad at their presence, as that was prior to the conflict by two days. The Sultan pitched his red war royal tent, and the report came in that Mengű Teműr had camped up against Ḥamāh, together with the Tatar armies, leading 80,000, among them were 50,000 Mongols, while the rest of them were apostates, Georgians, [Seljuq] Rūm, Armenians and Franks. One of the mamluks of the emir Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-`Ajamī al-jāliq defected to them, and guided them to the Muslims’ weak places, telling them of their numbers.

Цитата

It was confirmed that one of the Tatar army defected, and entered Ḥamāh, saying to the deputy in it: “Write this very hour to the Sultan: 44,000 Mongols, who will target the center and the right flank, which for them is very strong, so strengthen the left flank of the Muslims, and make sure to protect the standards.” The Sultan read this letter, and rode at dawn to strengthen the left flank, and to prepare as best he could.

Общая численность армии монголов может быть "условным числом" - "дважды сорок". Т.е. "очень много", "все войско иль-хана".

 

Цитата

When the Sultan rode during the morning of that day to arrange the vanguard (aṭlāb), he led the army personally, and thus their morale was high, their spirits resolute, and he incited them to be steadfast, and keep patient. He then returned to his station in the center, relying upon the Lord leading a proved army more steadfast than the mountains, and gardens more barren than fixed misfortunes.

Опять не понимаю перевода Кука. Почему "авангард"? Если правильно понимаю - тут просто "полки" или "отряды". "Урядил полки".

 

Цитата

The order of battle was according to this arrangement:


The victorious Manṣūrī right flank: in it al-Malik al-Man ṣ ūr Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad, ruler of Ḥamāh, and the Ḥamān army, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baysarā al-Shamsī, the emir `Alā al-Dīn Țīburs al-Wazīrī al-ḥājj, the emir `Izz al-Dīn Aybak al-afram, amīr jandār al- Ṣāliḥī, the emir `Alā’ al-Dīn Kushtghadī al-Shamsī, and those added to them from the emirs of the marching-bands (ṭablkhānāt), and the captains of ten, commanders of the freeborn troops, their troops, other sections of the army, the emir Ḥusām al-Dīn Lājīn amīr silāḥ [armorer] al-Manṣūrī, deputy of Syria, the Syrian emirs, and the Syrian army. At the forefront of the right flank was Sharaf al-Dīn `Īsā b. al-Muhannā, the Āl Faḍl, the Āl Murā, the Bedouin of the Syrian lands, with those who joined them.


The blessed Islamic left flank: in it the emir Shams al-Dīn Sunqur al-ashqar, those Ẓāhirī mamluks who were with him, the emir Sayf al-Dīn Aytimish al-Sa`dī, the emir Badr al-Dīn Bīlīk al-Aydimurī, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baktāsh al-Fakhrī, amīr ṣilāḥ, the emir `Alam al-Dīn Sanjar al-Ḥalabī al-Ṣāliḥī, the emir Sayf al-Dīn Bakkā al-`Alā’ī, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baktūt al-`Alā’ī, the emir Sayf al-Dīn Jabrak al-Tatarī, and those emirs of 1000s. At forefront of the left flank were the Turkmen in their masses, and the army of Ḥiṣnal-Akrād.


The signal-flag (al-jālīsh), which was in the forward part of the center, the emir Ḥusām al-Dīn Țurunṭāy, the deputy of the awe-inspiring sultanate, and those emirs, the mafārida, his mamluks, his troops which were added to him, and the emir Rukn al-Dīn Abājī the chamberlain, the emir Badr al-Dīn Baktāsh b. Karmūn, and those royal Manṣūrī mamluks with them. The Sultan stood beneath the victorious standards, while around him were his mamluks, his courtiers, the armorers, the standard-bearers (al-sanjaqdāriyya), and the axe-men (ṭabardāriyya). He was steadfast in the saddle of his noble horse like the steadfastness of a deeply-rooted lofty mountain, seeking reward in the path of God as long as he attends to matters and endures hardships.

 

Вот интересно - как можно было бы назвать "переводчика", который бы сунулся переводить того же Ливия, но при этом не знал бы значений слов "манипула", "центурион", "эдил" и "комиции"? Вот тут то же самое.

Цитата

the emirs of the marching-bands (ṭablkhānāt)

Источники по мамлюкскому Египту, значит, переводим...

Это amir țablkhāna, он же amir arba'in. Т.е. носители военного ранга "эмира с барабанами"/"эмира сорока". Воинов у них под началом обычно было больше, сотня или около того.

Цитата

the captains of ten

Это amir 'ashara, еще один ранг у мамлюков. "Эмиры десяти".

Цитата

the freeborn troops

Если правильно понимаю - Кук так зачем-то переводит вполне устоявшийся термин, "халка".

Цитата

one of the commanders of the freeborn troops (ḥalqa)

 

Цитата

At the forefront of the right flank ... At forefront of the left flank

Опять "авангарды". Что за слово в оригинале - ??? Амитаи-Прейсс трактует его иначе - "края, фланги" правого и левого крыла.

 

Цитата

The signal-flag (al-jālīsh) which was in the forward part of the center

По этимологии, насколько понимаю, это и есть "флаг, знамя". Только в данном случае это технический термин, как раз "авангард". "Передовой полк", если так можно сказать. Или "санджак". =)

Цитата

the victorious standards

Что тут в оригинале - ??? Может и правда так, может - the victorious al-jālīsh. Тут бы Мартинеса поглядеть - но я его работы не видел... Кроме этого - Амитаи-Прейсс пишет, что слово jālīsh ясно читается и у аль-Фурата, и у аль-Мансури. У аль-Мансури в переводе Кука соответствующий фрагмент и правда находится без труда. Но в его же переводе аль-Фурата чего-то похожего уже толком не найти. Почему?

 

Дополнительно.

Цитата

David Cook is professor of religion at Rice University, US. His areas of specialization include early Islamic history and development, Muslim apocalyptic literature, radical Islam, historical astronomy, and Judeo-Arabic literature.

В общем - не Амитаи-Прейсс или Никол. "Арабский знает", в остальном - не его эпоха, не его тематика, не его интерес. Реалий и терминологии он не знает и знать не хочет, никакой литературы (специальной или других переводов) не читал.

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The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, or, al-Nawādir al-Sulṭāniyya wa’l-Maḥāsin al-Yūsufiyya by Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād. Translated by D.S. Richards. 2002

Акра. 4.10.1189

izobrazhenie_2021-02-04_024649.thumb.png

izobrazhenie_2021-02-04_024734.thumb.png

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В 03.02.2021в18:15, hoplit сказал:

У аль-Мансури в переводе Кука соответствующий фрагмент и правда находится без труда.

Кажется разобрался. 

Издание аль-Мансури.

На странице 197.

izobrazhenie_2021-02-07_002634.thumb.png

Если я правильно понял, то 

Цитата

forefront of the left flank

это

izobrazhenie_2021-02-07_002817.png.ff8b9

Моя попытка перепечатать

Цитата

رأس اليسرة

اليسرة - это, если правильно понимаю, "майсара", т.е. "левое крыло".

رأس - "вершина, кончик, острие, конец, голова". В принципе - понятно, откуда Кук взял "forefront". Большинство исследователей, насколько смог проверить, такие обороты переводят "extreme".

رأس اليسرة - extreme maysara, extreme left wing.

А вот это вот

izobrazhenie_2021-02-07_004731.png.7f99f

получается "extreme maimana", т.е. "оконечность правого крыла"? Или не "оконечность"... А то и "то оконечность - то нет".

 

Для памяти.

joxi_screenshot_1612648257520.png.80ec51

 

 

Добавлю еще из Р. Амитаи.

Reuven Amitai. Whither the Ilkhanid Army? Ghazan's First Campaign into Syria (1299–1230) // Warfare in Inner Asian History (500-1800). 2002. Написана была, насколько понимаю, раньше. В 2000-м.

Цитата

83 Rashīd al-Dīn does not use the term maysara, but it is clear that he has generally been giving a rundown of the entire Mongol army from the extreme right wing onward. His exact words are zīr-i qūl-i bozorg, but this is not to be understood as “behind the great center” in the sense of “after” (as Martinez, “Īl-Xānid Army, ” p. 167, takes it), but rather “afterwards in the line-up along the front.” Otherwise we are to understand that Ghazan placed his household troops and three tümen s behind the front line, beside the rear guard, and there was no Left wing at all.

Т.е. - язык описаний таков, что даже специалисты расходятся в том, что там за чем и рядом с чем. =(

С другой стороны, по Второй битве при Хомсе.

Цитата

The placement of the Turkmen (along with the contingent from Hisn al-Akrad) and bedouin in the Left and Right flank respectively is not without problems. Baybars al-Mansun writes that these two groups were at the "head" (ra's) of the wings. Al-Dhahabi, however, who evidently had an independent source, says that the bedouin and Turkmen were at the extreme end of the Right and Left wings. In addition, Baybars al-Mansurt had earlier spoken of how the Sultan had organized his army into Center, Right wing, Left wing and two flanks (janahayn). Later, when he provides details, he does not mention the janahayn. Perhaps, then, he intended that ra's al-maymana meant janah al-maymana, and so on. Finally, c Isa b. Muhanna's subsequent attack on the flank of the Mongol Left (see below) suggests that he was placed to the east of the Mamluk Right.

У Кука это earlier spoken дано так

Цитата

When it was the night of Thursday, they traveled from Ḥamāh, and arranged their army, so that their right flank was towards Ḥamāh, while their left flank was towards Salamiyya, and they drove together seeking battle. The Sultan also arranged the army into right and left flanks — a center and two “wings” (flanks) — in accord with what we will describe.

Bezyimyannyiy.jpg.98bff83a5bdf3d20654f66

Справа налево - майсара (правый фланг), маймана (левый фланг), кальб (центр), далее - "два крыла" (جناحين). Насколько понимаю - тут дано простое перечисление, через "и" (و). То есть - вполне логичное перечисление, как его дает Амитаи, Кук превратил не пойми во что. Могу предположить, что "подбивал под понимание", ранее же  

Цитата

their right flank was towards Ḥamāh, while their left flank was towards Salamiyya

 

Для сравнения. Русский перевод Рашид-ад-Дина. Третья битва при Хомсе.

Цитата

В голове правого крыла был эмир Мулай, за ним эмирзадэ Саталмиш, за ним эмир Кутлугшах, а за ним Яман и Муртад, каждый со своим туманом. В средней рати [стоял] государь ислама, словно величавая гора, а в передовом отряде средней рати эмиры Чобан и Султан: Чобан направо, а Султан налево. Справа от средней рати был Тогрулча сын Аджуя-шукурчи. Ниже главной средней рати находились эв-огланы, за ними Ильбасмиш со своим туманом, за ним Чечек, за ним Курумиши сын Алинака, и позади всех Курбука-бахадур, который ведал задней ратью

Цитата

в голове - бар аввал

главная средняя рать - кул-и бузург

задняя рать - сāка

У Р. Амитаи.

Цитата

Following Rashīd al-Dīn's account,77 we can reconstruct the Mongol order of battle without two much trouble (fig. 2). On the extreme right (awwal-i maymana) was Mulai — a name often rendered in the sources as Bulai.78After him was Amīrzādah Satalmish,79 then Qutlugh-Shāh, followed by two names which are unclear, Yaman and perhaps Merted (M-R-T-D). The former certainly does not sound Mongolian or Turkish, but is confirmed by Wassāf;80 and the latter remains obscure, but may be identified with Bortas who is mentioned later by Wassaf together with Yaman.81 Be this as it may, each of these commanders are said to have led a tümen. In the center (qalb) was Ghazan himself, “like a majestic mountain.” In front of him was a strong vanguard (muqaddima) lead by Chūpān on the right and one Sultan on the left; the latter many be the Sultan Yasa'ul mentioned later by Wassāf.82To the immediate right of Center (yamīn-i qalb) was Toghrilche, the son of Aju Sokorchi, positioned there it would seem to provide additional cover for the Ilkhan in the center. Continuing on to the left wing83from the “Great Center” (qol-i buzurg), were the royal retainers (ev oghlanān),84 which appear to be distinct from the royal guard. The expression qol-i buzurg may be a calque of the Mongolian yeke qol (“large” or “imperial center”) which was another term for the royal bodyguard or baghaturs.85 In any event, the ev oghlanān provided extra protection to the Center to the left. The left wing proper was composed of Ilbasmish with his tümen, then Chichak, then Qurmishi the son of Alinaq.86The rearguard (sāqa) of the army was commanded by Korbuqa Bahādur.

 

Мамлюки.

Цитата

At this point, we can review the evidence regarding the order of battle of each side. The two above-cited fifteenth-century authors give us a good picture of the Mamluks' formation (fig. 1), apparently arranged only after coming within eyesight of the Mongols. On the extreme right wing (maymana) was the bedouin chief of Syria 'Īsā b. Muhannā, leading the various tribes of north Syria (Āl Mirā, Āl 'Alī and Āl Kalb, besides — so it would seem — his own Āl Fadl). The right wing proper was formed by the armies of Aleppo and Hama under the governor of the former city, Balāban al-Tabbākhī. The Left wing (maysara) was composed of five amirs of 1000 who are named (Bektash al-Fakhrī amīr silāh, Aqqush Qattāl al-Sabu', 'Alam al-Dīn Sanjar al-Dawadārī and Toghril al-Īghānī), plus the governor of Tripoli Hājj Kurt (with his army), and the “squadron” (tulb) of Lachin al-Ustādār, including the amirs of 40 from the remnant of the Zāhiriyya (mamluks of al-Zāhir Baybars) and their entourages. As will be seen, the last-named amir, Lachin al-Ustādār was himself behind the lines with the young Sultan. The center (qalb) was composed of the rest of the army, under Salar and Baybars al-Jashnakīr, together with Burulghi, Qutlubek al-Hājib, Aybeg al-Khaznadār; all of these were accompanied by a number of lesser amirs. The royal Mamluks were on either side of the center. The Sultan himself, as mentioned above, was behind the lines, under the tutelage of Lachin al-Ustādār. The royal standard (sanjaq al-sultān) was placed away from the Sultan, to attract the enemy and keep them away from him. In the vanguard (muqaddima) were placed 500 mamluk naft — or Greek-fire — throwers (zarrāqūn). 

Схема у меня отвратительная, но на ней, насколько смог разобрать, указанный extreme right wing расположен как раз в авангарде правого крыла, right wing proper стоит как раз позади него...

 

Еще одна непонятка. Судить по переводам глупо, но у Кука (одного переводчика) тексты из аль-Фурата и аль-Мансури несколько отличаются. По Третьей битве при Хомсе у нас тексты только 15 века. Как у мамлюков было с терминологичностью? То есть - если Мартинес и Амитаи не могут договориться на тему "потом, в смысле - сзади" и "потом, в смысле - дальше вдоль фронта"... Сами-то мамлюки с этим проблем не испытывали? Или это проблемы сугубо современных переводчиков? 0_о??

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Восторг, только сейчас обратил внимание. Саладин провел смотр армии в 567/1171. Описание смотра составил аль-Кади аль-Фадил, дошло оно до нас в пересказе аль-Макризи. 

У Гибба

Цитата

The total number of tulbs reviewed was 174, and 20 tulbs were absent.

У Айлона

Цитата

In 567 Salah ad-Din reviewed his troops; 140 tulbs were present, 20 absent.

У Лева

Цитата

On 8 Muharram 567/ 11 September 1171, Salh ad-Din held a review of  the old and new armies. The army was made up of 167 tulbs of  which 147 were present at the review.

А чего в гугл-буке творится - даже пересказывать не хочу. 

хахаха :mellow:

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Hugh Kennedy. The Military // Crisis and continuity at the Abbasid court: formal and informal politics in the caliphate of al-Muqtadir (295-320/908-32). 2013

Цитата

The caliph al-Muqtadir inherited a large, expensive and potentially effective military organization which had been built up by his predecessors. The army developed from the forces which had emerged at the end of the period of anarchy in Samarra in 256/870. The creation of this army was largely the work of al-Muwaffaq, never caliph himself but effectively both regent and military commander for his brother al-Muʿtamid (r. 256–79/870–92). Al-Muwaffaq’s great achievement was to reestablish a personal bond between the Abbasid family and the military which had fallen into abeyance after the death of the warrior caliph al-Muʿtaṣim (218/833). The close relations were strengthened during the long and hard campaigns which al-Muwaffaq led against the Zanj rebels in southern Iraq. He led the army in person and was tirelessly in the field. During the latter part of these campaigns, he was assisted by his son, later the caliph al-Muʿtaḍid, who, like his father, was an active military leader.

Цитата

But there was another major problem with the military of al-Muqtadir’s reign and that was the lack of leadership from the caliph himself. As argued above, the revival of the caliphate after the anarchy at Samarra was achieved by the close personal involvement of members of the Abbasid family with the army, a tradition continued by al-Muʿtaḍid and al-Muktafī. Al-Muqtadir never led the army until the last encounter when he was killed, and even then his contribution was unimpressive. He never left Baghdad and never accompanied the army when it left the capital. While this might have been understandable and excusable when he was a boy ruler, it must have been much less so as he grew older. Many men in the army, and civilian inhabitants of Baghdad, must have felt let down and even betrayed by the fact that their monarch could not bring himself to lead his armies when the entire existence of the Abbasid state was threatened by the Qarāmiṭa. In the end, it was the breakdown of relations between the caliph and the military leadership which, more than any other signle factor, led to the collapse of Abbasid power.

Занятно - не сильно-то и отличается от того, что пишет по Европе Раннего Средневековья тот же Холсолл. Король обязан был водить войско в походы - в противном случае он имел немало шансов перестать быть королем.

 

Цитата

The overwhelming bulk of the expenditure is directly concerned with the military. Of the total expenditure of 7,915 dīnār per day, 5,121 are entirely military, 1,943 in areas (like riding animals and stables) that served both military and non-military and only 851 in areas like the bureaucracy which can be described as truly civilian (though even in this case, the main function of the bureaucracy was to arrange payment of the army). 

 

Опять всплывает тема, что вот именно воевать, с кишками и кровушкой, а не "службу отбывать", за "несколько динаров" ординарной платы, дураков не было.

Цитата

Fighting the Qarāmiṭa involved hardship, danger, thirst and exhaustion without any prospect of booty.

Опять вполне подойдет для той же Европы до конца Средних веков включительно. Богатая добыча манила даже больше платы за службу. Это была лотерея, где можно было сорвать куш.

Цитата

The booty which could be acquired legitimately, for example after the successful assault upon a town, could enrich all ranks in an invading army down to the very humblest. After the capture of Barfleur, in 1346, the town was “plundered of its gold, silver and precious jewels. [Edward Ill’s army] found so much of it there that the very servants of the army turned up their noses at fur-lined gowns.” Robert Knolles’ capture of Auxerre, in March 1359, earned him 500,000 gold moutons in booty alone, and if we add to this the ransoms of prisoners and the forty thousand moutons and forty thousand pearls which were the agreed price of his evacuation of the place, the profits for an army of two or three thousand men may easily be calculated.

Цитата

To pluck one example from thousands, the ransom of Guillaume, lord of Chateauvillain, may be mentioned. This Burgundian nobleman was captured by four French captains at Marigny, in 1430, and a ransom of twenty thousand saluts d’or was agreed

Правитель часто выступал не столько в качестве власти, сколько в качестве организатора прибыльного военного предприятия.

 

gold mouton - agnel d'or или mouton d’or. Насколько понимаю - аналог золотого флорина, плата ездящего лучник где-то за неделю службы. Для сравнения - 6 пенсов в день это столько, сколько получал наемный батрак во время уборки хлеба...

DM09176_0.thumb.jpg.0fce7f2d0dffc238486e

 

Отсюда же торчат проблемы с оборонительными войнами, особенно против "кочевников и приравненных к ним". 

Цитата

Partly this was because the Qarāmiṭa were so elusive and mobile, able to traverse the desert with remarkable speed and disappear into the wilderness where their enemies could not pursue them. In fact, they enjoyed many of the strategic advantages over the armies of the settled states that the original Arab conquerors of the Fertile Crescent had in the first/seventh century.

Цитата

It is likely that the resources of military manpower provided by the warbands were not adequate for such defensive warfare, and hence recourse was had to other means of raising troops. This seems all the more likely as such warfare — coast watch and boatbuilding — would have brought little gain for warbands and their leaders, and at the same time considerable risk if it should actually come to any fighting.

Как результат

Цитата

Modern analysis of the campaign can show that Charles’ campaign was in many respects no different in its methods, and no less successful in its results, than many earlier or later campaigns against the Vikings, who, as will become clear, were very difficult foes. Yet to contemporary writers it was, rightly or wrongly, seen as a dismal failure and therefore the cost to Charles and the Carolingian dynasty was high. These writers, it has been shown, were hostile to Charles largely for their own reasons. Nevertheless, ninth-century politics was not governed by objective strategic analysis. Carolingian kings were expected to win battles, and by failing in a high-profile campaign at just the time when his enemies were winning heroic laurels, Charles presented his enemies with a golden opportunity to denigrate his abilities as king. Within a year or so he had been deposed by his nephew, Arnulf of Carinthia, who took over rule of the East Franks, whilst Odo himself replaced Charles as king in West Francia.

 

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The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from ‘al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh’. Translated by D.S. Richards. 2006-8

Цитата

The Year 502 [1108 - 1109]

He had also prepared supplies, foodstuffs and military equipment. He laid hands on the notables in Mosul and put them in prison. He also expelled more that 20,000 of the city militia and publicly proclaimed, ‘If any two citizens gather to talk about this situation, I shall execute them.’

Цитата

The Year 532 [1137 - 1138]

The Byzantines then moved away towards Aleppo and camped on the Quwayq with the Franks from the Syrian littoral. The next day with their horse and foot they assaulted Aleppo. The Aleppan militia came out to meet them and fought a fierce battle with them. A host of Byzantines were killed or wounded. One killed was a general of noble standing among them. They withdrew in disarray, waited three days but, not seeing any chance of success, then moved to al-Atharib, where the Muslim population was in great fear. On 9 Sha‘ban [= 21 April 1138] they fled, so the Byzantines seized it and left their prisoners and captives from Buza‘a there along with a detachment of Byzantines to guard them and hold the citadel. The main force left and when Emir Sawar in Aleppo heard this he set out with the troops he had to al-Atharib and fell upon the Greeks there. He killed them, freed the prisoners and captives and returned to Aleppo.

Цитата

The Year 534 [1139 - 1140]

Next Zanki advanced to Damascus, where he camped. A large gathering of the regular troops of Damascus, the local militia and foot-soldiers from the Ghu†a met him in battle and suffered a defeat. They fell to the sword in great numbers and likewise many were taken prisoner. The survivors returned wounded. That day the city was on the point of being taken, but Zanki withdrew from the battle and held back for several days. He sent a succession of envoys to the ruler of Damascus and offered him Baalbek, Homs and other places that he might choose. He inclined towards surrender but others of his entourage turned it down and pointed out the likely dangerous consequences, adding that Zanki might deal treacherously with him, as he had with the men of Baalbek. After his refusal to surrender Zanki resumed the fighting and the assaults.

Цитата

The Year 549 [1154-1155]

Thereupon Nur al-Dîn marched to Damascus, having already corresponded with the local militia and won their support. They promised to deliver the city to him. ... As for the way Damascus surrendered, when he put it under siege, the militia with whom he had made contact, rose up and gave him access to the city by the East Gate. 

Цитата

The Year 570 [1174-1175] 

On their arrival, Sa‘d al-Dîn arrested Shams al-Dîn Ibn al-Dâya and his brothers and also Ra’îs ibn al-Khashshâb, the headman of Aleppo and leader of the militia there. Had it not been for the illness of Shams al-Dîn Ibn al-Dâya, he would not have been able to do that.

Цитата

The Year 581 [1185-1186]

The fief he held was Homs and Rahba. He left Saladin and went to Homs, passing by Aleppo, where he summoned a group of the militia and gave them money. Having arrived at Homs, he wrote to several of the men of Damascus and made an agreement with them for the surrender of the city to him, if Saladin should die.

 

Цитата

The Year 617 [1220-1221] 

They departed in the direction of Samarqand, having ascertained that Khwarazm Shâh, who was still in his position between Tirmidh and Balkh, was powerless against them. They took with them as prisoners the survivors of the Bukhara population. They made them travel on foot in the most wretched fashion. All who became exhausted and unable to walk they killed. When they approached Samarqand, they sent the cavalry on before and left the infantry, the prisoners and the baggage behind them, until they advanced little by little, to be more terrifying to the hearts of the Muslims. When the people of the city saw the dense mass of them, they were horrified.


On the next day the prisoners, infantry and baggage arrived. With every ten prisoners there was a banner, so the city’s inhabitants thought that all were fighting troops. The city, in which were 50,000 warriors of the Khwarazmian army and, as far as the common people were concerned, an innumerable multitude, was fully surrounded. Some brave locals, men of steadfast strength, sallied forth on foot. None of the Khwarazmian troops went out with them because of the fear of these accursed ones in their hearts. The men on foot engaged the enemy outside the city. The Tatars continued to withdraw and the citizens to follow them with eager confidence. The infidels had positioned an ambush for them and, when they had passed beyond the ambushers, they emerged and cut them off from the city. The others who had initially engaged them turned back and [the local volunteers], caught in the middle, were cut down by the sword on every side. Not one of them survived. They were killed to the last man as martyrs (may God be pleased with them). According to reports, they numbered 70,000.

 

Claude Cahen. Mouvements Populaires Et Autonomisme Urbain Dans L'Asie Musulmane Du Moyen Age, I // Arabica. Volume 6: Issue 1. 1959

Цитата

C'est une question delicate que de savoir dans quelle mesure les ahdat representent la population urbaine dans son ensemble ou bien seulement certains elements dresses contre d'autres. Il ne semble pas qu'on puisse donner de reponse generale a cette interrogation. Dans certains cas, les ahdat nous apparaissent groupes derriere des chefs de riche bourgeoisie, voire des sharifs, qui certes peuvent, pour des raisons d'interit personnel, avoir une attitude demagogique ou democratique, mais qui paraissent bien cependant aussi representer l'opinion de leur couche sociale. On peut comprendre que de larges elements de la population fassent front contre des oppressions etrangeres, et en ce cas les ahdat representent l'aile marchante d'une sorte de resistance municipale aux gouvernements. D'autres fois, il nous semble au contraire y avoir conflit entre des elements bourgeois moderes, moins autonomistes s'ils peuvent craindre que l'autonomie les mette a la merci du petit peuple, et des elements beaucoup plus populaires au sein des ahdat, au point de pouvoir etre compares a cet egard aux `ayyarun dont nous reparlerons. Certains  termes qui leur sont appliques (suttar, hizb) suggereraient meme des rapprochements plus formels avec les 'ayyärs, si l'on pouvait itre toujours sur que des mots qui ont à la fois des significations larges et des acceptions techniques sont toujours pris de cette seconde facon. Nous aurons ulterieuremeilt a revenir sur cette question, lorsqu'il aura ete parle des 'ayyarun.

 

D.G. Tor. Violent Order: Religious Warfare, Chivalry, and the 'Ayyar Phenomenon in the Medieval Islamic World. 2007

Насколько понимаю - автор исходит из того, что слово "айяр" при своем появлении в начале 9 века было не более чем другим обозначение для гази/мутатавви. И в очередной раз поминает "приватизацию джихада" где-то с конца 8 века.

Цитата

This chapter explores how, in the eighth and ninth centuries, control over this dual obligation, particularly the Ji­had component of it, was transferred from the government to private, volunteer religious warriors. The transference of authority and leadership in these key gov­ernmental functions to the non-state sector led, first, to the rise of private mili­tias, among them the  'ayyàrs; and, second, to the weakening of 'Abbäsid author­ity and the subsequent passing of actual political power into the hands of volun­teer warriors such as the 'ayyàr Saffarids.

Если я правильно понимаю написанное Тором, то тот же Якуб ибн Лейс ас-Саффар и его айяры не особо и отличались от тех же мурабитов.

 

Можно вот это добавить.

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The History of al-Tabari Vol. 35. The Crisis of the 'Abbasid Caliphate: The Caliphates of al-Musta'in and al-Mu'tazz A.D. 862-869/A.H. 248-255.

Цитата

On a Monday in Dhu al-Qa'dah, 251 (November 24 - December 23, 865), The Baghdadis engaged in a great battle in which they defeated the Turks and looted their camp. The circumstances were as follows. The gates were opened on both sides of the city. Mangonels and ballistas were set up at all the gates and in the river vessels in the Tigris. The entire army then came out of the city. Ibn Tahir, Bugha and Wasif rode out when both factions were on the march, and the battle was engaged as far as the Gate of the Fief (of Umm Ja`far). The three of them then crossed over to the Shammasiyyah Gate, and Ibn Tahir sat under a canopy that was erected for him. Archers with nawaki bows moved out from Baghdad in skiffs. At times a single arrow went through several men, killing all of them. The Turks were routed, and the Baghdadis pursued them all the way to their camp, where they plundered their market. The loyalists set aflame one of the Turkish boats, known as The Iron One (al-Hadidi); it had inflicted much damage on the people of Baghdad.

Those who were in it drowned. In addition they took two of their river boats as the Turks fled, paying heed to nothing else. Every time a head was brought, Wasif and Bugha would say, "By God, the mawlas are broken." 

The Baghdadis pursued them until Rudhabar,' where Abu Ahmad b. al-Mutawakkil stood, and sent the mawlas back into the fight; he warned them that if they did not turn back, they would be totally routed and the enemy would pursue them all the way to Samarra. As a result, they re-formed and returned to battle. The rabble began to sever the heads of the dead, for Muhammad b. Abdallah began to bestow necklaces and gifts to anyone bringing in a head. The practice became excessive, however, and the Turks and the mawlas who were under the command of Bugha and Wasif were visibly displeased. Then, as a southerly wind carried the dust and the smoke of the burning fires, the banners of al-Hasan b. al-Afshin were brought forward together with the Turkish flags. At the head of the flags was a red standard that was stolen by one of Shahak's slaves who forgot to lower it. When the Baghdadis saw the red standard and those behind it, they imagined that the Turks had returned to do combat, and fled. Some of those who stood their ground attempted to kill Shahak's slave, who now realized what was happening and lowered the flag. The people were fleeing in confusion as the Turks fell back to their camp, not knowing that the Baghdadis were in retreat and that they could attack them. Thus the two factions broke away from each other.

 

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Вот к этому.

The History of Al-Tabari. Volume XXXI. The War Between Brothers. The Caliphate of Muhammad Al-Amin. A.D. 809-813/A.H. 193-198

Уличные бои в Багдаде в 813-м году, Четвертая фитна.

Цитата

It has been mentioned: One of Tahir's Khurasanian commanders, a man of courage and strength, went out one day to fight. Seeing some unclothed men without weapons, he said to his companions in scorn and contempt, "Are only these whom I see fighting us?" "Yes ," he was told , "these whom you see are the plague!" "Fie on you," he said , "shrinking from them and holding back, when you have splendid weapons, equipment, and strength, as well as your bravery and courage! What could the devices of these I see accomplish, when they have no weapons, no equipment, and no armor to protect them?" So he strung his bow and went forward. One of the men [on the other side ] saw him and went toward him with a pitch-covered reed mat in his hand and a horse's nose bag full of stones under his arm. Whenever the Khurasinian shot an arrow, the vagrant (ayyur) covered himself, and the arrow fell on his mat or near him. He would then take it and put it into a part of his reed mat he had prepared for that purpose and had fashioned like a quiver. Whenever an arrow fell, he would take it and cry out, "A daniq!" - that is to say, he had obtained the value of the arrow, which was a daniq. The Khurasinian and the vagrant continued at this until the Khurisinian exhausted his arrows. He then rushed at the vagrant to strike him with his sword. The latter took a stone out of his bag, put it into a sling, hurled it, and did not miss the man's eye. Then he hurled another and would have knocked the man off his horse, had he not dodged it. The man wheeled round and retreated, saying, "These people are not human beings!"

[Continuing , the narrator of this account ) said: It has been related to me that when the story of the man was told to Tahir, he was moved to laughter and excused the Khurisinian from going out to fight. 

У Табари вообще есть некоторое количество зарисовок, когда подобные персонажи вполне успешно отгоняли камнями (насколько понимаю - с помощью пращ) гулямов-тюрок.

 

The History of al-Tabari Vol. 35. The Crisis of the 'Abbasid Caliphate: The Caliphates of al-Musta'in and al-Mu'tazz A.D. 862-869/A.H. 248-255.

Во время "Анархии в Самарре".

Цитата

During one of those days, Yantawayh and his companions among the vagabonds reportedly set out from the Qatrabbul Gate and continued cursing the Turks until they passed Qatrabbul. Some Turks crossed over in skiffs , shooting arrows at them. They killed one of the vagabonds and wounded ten others. However, the vagabonds overwhelmed them with stones causing numerous casualties, so that the Turks retreated to their camp. Yantawayh was brought to the palace of Ibn Tahir who ordered him not to go out except on a day of battle. The former was then presented a bracelet of honor, and Ibn Tahir ordered that he be given five hundred dirhams.

Это волонтеры-айяры. С оружием в виде дубинки с гворздями, да и та не собственная - а выданная.

Еще пример

Цитата

I heard some say that a young man who had not yet reached puberty took part in this battle. He had a nosebag filled with stones and a slingshot in his hand. He would cast (the stones) never missing the faces of the Turks and their animals. Four Turkish horsemen who were bowmen began to shoot at him but they always missed. He would shoot back and hit them, and their mounts would then throw them. The Turks kept at it, until, assisted by four Maghribi horsemen carrying lances and shields, they charged at him. Two of them came upon him, but he threw himself in the water. They jumped in after the boy, but could not catch up with him. He crossed to the East Side and taunted them. The troops proclaimed "God is Great!" and returned without ever catching him.

 

The revolt of the Zanj: A.D. 869-879 / A.H. 255-265

Начало восстания.

Цитата

`Ali prayed with them, and in a sermon (khutbah) he recalled the wretched state from which, through him, God had rescued them. 'Ali said that he wanted to improve their condition, giving them slaves (al-'abid), money, and homes to possess for themselves, and that by them they could achieve the greatest things. He then swore a solemn oath, and when his prayer and sermon were complete he ordered those who had followed his words to instruct those non-Arabic speakers among them who had not understood, in order lalsol to raise their spirits. That was done, and `Ali entered the castle.

Цитата

`Ali ordered his troops to move to al-Razigiyyah, which was located at the far side of al-Badhiward. He reached there at the time of the midday prayer, which they performed and then prepared for battle. At the time where were only three swords in `Ali's so-called "army"- namely, his own, that of `Ali b. Abin, and that of Muhammad b. Salm. Between the time of the midday and afternoon prayers, `Ali departed [from al-Razigiyyah] with his troops and hastened back toward al-Muhammadiyyah, placing `Ali b. Aban in their rear with orders to report on anyone following them. He himself proceeded at the head of the company (of blacks) until they reached al-Muhammadiyyah. He sat by the water's edge and ordered the company to quench their thirst. When the troops arrived, 'Ali b. Aban said to him that they had seen swords glistening and heard the sounds of people moving behind them but that they could not tell whether they were moving away or heading toward them. He was still speaking when the enemy arrived. The Zanj called one another to arms and Abu Salih Mufarraj al-Nubi hastened forth with Rayhan b. Salih and Fath al-Hajiam. Fath had been eating (at the time), and so he went into the fray holding his plate. As his companions advanced, one of the Shurajiyyin called Bulbul encountered Fath, who attacked him with his plate and beat him with it, causing Bulbul to drop his weapon, turn, and flee. He and four thousand other men were put to flight, some being killed and others dying of thirst on the way. A number, too, were taken captive and brought to the leader of the Zanj who ordered them beheaded. Their heads were stacked on the backs of mules seized from the Shurajiyyin , who had used them for transporting the nitrous topsoil (shuraj). The procession set out and reached al Qadisiyyah by the time of the evening prayer.

Ополчение Басры выступает против зинджей. 869 год.

Цитата

Muhammad b. al-Hasan - Muhammad b. Sim`an al-Katib: On Monday , the 14th of Dhu al-Qa`dah (October 24, 869), the people of al-Bagrah assembled together and went forth in the wake of what they regarded as a triumph over the Zanj the previous day. The man selected to lead the expedition was a Baran by the name of Hammid al-Siji, a sailor experienced in operating and fighting from barges. The force comprised volunteers, archers, people from the main mosque, those from the Bililiyyah and Sa`diyyah factions prepared to follow Hammid, and onlookers from the Hishimites, Qurayshites, and other sections of the populace. Three barges were loaded with archers who crowded on board, eager to get to the scene of battle. A mob proceeded on foot, some bearing arms while others were mere spectators without weapons. The barges and boats entered the Umm Habib canal on the tide after sunset that same day. The procession of foot soldiers and spectators along the canal bank was so dense and numerous that they blocked from view everything in front of them. The Zanj leader had stationed himself on the canal known as al-Shaylin.

 

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The History of al-Tabari. The return of the Caliphate to Baghdad. Translated and annotated by Franz Rosenthal.

Битва у Хамы. 29 ноября 903 год. Дата - по юлианскому календарю.

Цитата

They marched [against him] and eventually reached a location that was reportedly twelve mil (twenty-four km) from Harrah. There, [on Tuesday] al-Muharram 6, (Tuesday, November 29, 903), they encountered the Qarmatian's men. He had sent them in advance, while he himself remained behind with a number of others; he had with him money that he had accumulated. His train was placed by him in the rear. A battle broke out between the government forces and those of the Qarmatian, and the fighting became fierce. The Qarmatian's men were routed, and many of them were killed or captured. The rest dispersed in the desert. 

Табари приводит подробный отчет о битве, который визирю отправил командующий армией после победы

Цитата

Muhammad b. Sulayman sent the wazir the following victory dispatch

Цитата

On Tuesday, al-Muharram 6,  (Tuesday, November 29, 903), I moved from the place known as al-Qarwanah to a place known as al `Alyanah with the entire army of allies. We advanced in battle order, center, right wing, left wing, and so on. I had not gone far when a report reached me indicating that the Qarmatian unbeliever had dispatched al-Nu`man, the son of the brother of Isma il b. al-Nu(man, one of his dd is, with three thousand horsemen and a large number of foot soldiers. He had encamped in a place known as Tmn( twelve mil [twenty-four km] from Hamah; all the horsemen and foot soldiers from Ma(arrat al-Nu(man and the region of the Fusays and other regions had joined him. I kept this information concealed from the officers and everybody else and did not reveal it. I asked the guide who was with me about the distance between us and that place. He said that it was six mil (twelve km).


Putting my trust in Almighty God, I ordered the guide to march against (al-Nu`man), rand he took everybody along. We marched until I reached the unbelievers. I found them arrayed in battle order, and wee saw their vanguards. When they noticed our approach, they moved toward us, and we moved toward them. They were divided into six squadrons. According to information given me by one of their leaders whom I overpowered, they had put in charge of their left wing ...  with one thousand five hundred horsemen. Behind their left wing, and opposite our right wing, they had set up an ambush with four hundred horsemen. In the center, they had placed ...  with one thousand four hundred horsemen and three thousand foot soldiers. On their right wing, they had placed They had one thousand four hundred horsemen with them, and they had set up an ambush with two hundred horsemen. They advanced steadily toward us, while we were marching toward them in closed formation, putting our trust in Almighty God. 

...

When we were in sight of each other, the squadron on their left wing attacked, whipping (their horses), and moved toward al-Husayn b. Hamdan, who was on the flank of the right wing. Al-Husayn - May God bless him and give him a good reward! - personally confronted them with all the men who were with him. Using their lances, they broke them in the Qarmatians' breasts, whereupon (the Qarmatians) withdrew from them. When the Qarmatians resumed their attack against them, they took their swords, striking the enemy in their faces. During the first onslaught, six hundred horsemen of the wicked unbelievers fell. Al-Husayn's men seized five hundred horses and four hundred silver necklaces. The Qarmatians turned their backs and fled, and al-IHusayn pursued them. They counter-attacked incessantly, making onslaught after onslaught. In the course of these engagements, one group of theirs after the other fell, until Almighty God had annihilated them. Less than two hundred of their men escaped.

The squadron on their right wing attacked al-Qasim b. Sima and Yumn al-Khadim and the Banu Shayban and Banu Tamim who were with them. They confronted them with their lances, until they broke them in the enemy, and they grappled with each other. A large number of the wicked were killed. At the time of their onslaught, they were attacked by Khalifah b. al-Mubarak and Lu'lu' whose three hundred horsemen I had deployed flanking Khalifah and all his men. They were fighting alongside the Banu Shayban and the Tamim. A great many of the unbelievers were killed, and (the government forces) pursued them. The Banu Shayban took three hundred horses and a hundred necklaces from them, and Khalifah's men took a like number.

Al-Nu`man and the men with him in the center advanced toward us. Positioned between the center and the right wing, I attacked with those who were with me. Khagan, Nasr al-Qushuri, and Muhammad b. Kumushjur and those with him on the right wing also attacked, as did Wasif Mushgir, Muhammad b. Ishaq b. Kundajiq ... Flanking the right wing were all those who had attacked the men in the center as well as those who had disengaged themselves from the attackers of al-Husayn b. Hamdan. They continued killing the unbelievers, horsemen and foot soldiers alike, until they were slain, over a distance of more than five mil (ten km).

When I went a half mil beyond the battle lines, I feared that the unbelievers might be planning a ruse against the foot soldiers and the train. Therefore I halted until they reached me. I gathered them and the men around me, while in front of me was the blessed spear, the spear of the Commander of the Faithful.

I had attacked right at the beginning, and so had the troops, while all the time `Isa al-Nushari secured the train, stationing battle lines behind them with the horsemen and the foot soldiers according to a plan I had drawn up for him. He did not leave his position, until all the troops from every location had returned to me'. I set up my tents at the place where I had halted, until everybody had encamped, and remained there until after the evening prayer, when all the men were safely quartered. I sent out vanguards, and then I dismounted and praised God profusely for the victory He had allowed us to enjoy. Each and every one of the officers and pages of the Commander of the Faithful as well as the non-Arabs and others, achieved their goal of assisting this blessed dynasty and offering it good counsel. God bless them all!

Что характерно - описания собственно процесса боя почти что и нет. В центре, к примеру.

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      - Henry Reynolds. The Other Side of the Frontier. Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia. 1981
      - John Connor. Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838. 2002
      -  Ronald M. Berndt. Warfare in the New Guinea Highlands.
      - Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern. Feasting on My Enemy: Images of Violence and Change in the New Guinea Highlands.
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Modes of Social Action in Armed Combat: Affect, Tradition and Reason in Tausug Private Warfare // Man New Series, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 586-596
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Reciprocity and Revenge in the Philippines: Some Preliminary Remarks about the Tausug of Jolo // Philippine Sociological Review. Vol. 16, No. 3/4 (JULY-OCTOBER, 1968), pp. 124-131
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Parrang Sabbil: Ritual suicide among the Tausug of Jolo // Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde. Deel 129, 1ste Afl., ANTHROPOLOGICA XV (1973), pp. 108-123
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Institutionalized Friendship and Warfare among the Tausug of Jolo // Ethnology. Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul., 1968), pp. 225-244
      - Thomas M. Kiefer. Power, Politics and Guns in Jolo: The Influence of Modern Weapons on Tao-Sug Legal and Economic Institutions // Philippine Sociological Review. Vol. 15, No. 1/2, Proceedings of the Fifth Visayas-Mindanao Convention: Philippine Sociological Society May 1-2, 1967 (JANUARY-APRIL, 1967), pp. 21-29
      - Armando L. Tan. Shame, Reciprocity and Revenge: Some Reflections on the Ideological Basis of Tausug Conflict // Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society. Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1981), pp. 294-300.
      - Karl G. Heider, Robert Gardner. Gardens of War: Life and Death in the New Guinea Stone Age. 1968.
      - P. D'Arcy. Maori and Muskets from a Pan-Polynesian Perspective // The New Zealand journal of history 34(1):117-132. April 2000. 
      - Andrew P. Vayda. Maoris and Muskets in New Zealand: Disruption of a War System // Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 85, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 560-584
      - D. U. Urlich. The Introduction and Diffusion of Firearms in New Zealand 1800–1840 // The Journal of the Polynesian Society. Vol. 79, No. 4 (DECEMBER 1970), pp. 399-41
      -  Barry Craig. Material culture of the upper Sepik‪ // Journal de la Société des Océanistes 2018/1 (n° 146), pages 189 à 201
      -  Paul B. Rosco. Warfare, Terrain, and Political Expansion // Human Ecology. Vol. 20, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 1-20
      - Anne-Marie Pétrequin and Pierre Pétrequin. Flèches de chasse, flèches de guerre: Le cas des Danis d'Irian Jaya (Indonésie) // Anne-Marie Pétrequin and Pierre Pétrequin. Bulletin de la Société préhistorique française. T. 87, No. 10/12, Spécial bilan de l'année de l'archéologie (1990), pp. 484-511
      - Warfare // Douglas L. Oliver. Ancient Tahitian Society. 1974
      - Bard Rydland Aaberge. Aboriginal Rainforest Shields of North Queensland [unpublished manuscript]. 2009
      - Leonard Y. Andaya. Nature of War and Peace among the Bugis–Makassar People // South East Asia Research. Volume 12, 2004 - Issue 1
      - Forts and Fortification in Wallacea: Archaeological and Ethnohistoric Investigations. Terra Australis. 2020
       
       
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Higi Armed Combat.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. THE EVOLUTION OF ZULU WARFARE.
      - Myron J. Echenberg. Late nineteenth-century military technology in Upper Volta // The Journal of African History, 12, pp 241-254. 1971.
      - E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Zande Warfare // Anthropos, Bd. 52, H. 1./2. (1957), pp. 239-262
      - Julian Cobbing. The Evolution of Ndebele Amabutho // The Journal of African History. Vol. 15, No. 4 (1974), pp. 607-631
       
       
      - Elizabeth Arkush and Charles Stanish. Interpreting Conflict in the Ancient Andes: Implications for the Archaeology of Warfare.
      - Elizabeth Arkush. War, Chronology, and Causality in the Titicaca Basin.
      - R.B. Ferguson. Blood of the Leviathan: Western Contact and Warfare in Amazonia.
      - J. Lizot. Population, Resources and Warfare Among the Yanomami.
      - Bruce Albert. On Yanomami Warfare: Rejoinder.
      - R. Brian Ferguson. Game Wars? Ecology and Conflict in Amazonia. 
      - R. Brian Ferguson. Ecological Consequences of Amazonian Warfare.
      - Marvin Harris. Animal Capture and Yanomamo Warfare: Retrospect and New Evidence.
       
       
      - Lydia T. Black. Warriors of Kodiak: Military Traditions of Kodiak Islanders.
      - Herbert D. G. Maschner and Katherine L. Reedy-Maschner. Raid, Retreat, Defend (Repeat): The Archaeology and Ethnohistory of Warfare on the North Pacific Rim.
      - Bruce Graham Trigger. Trade and Tribal Warfare on the St. Lawrence in the Sixteenth Century.
      - T. M. Hamilton. The Eskimo Bow and the Asiatic Composite.
      - Owen K. Mason. The Contest between the Ipiutak, Old Bering Sea, and Birnirk Polities and the Origin of Whaling during the First Millennium A.D. along Bering Strait.
      - Caroline Funk. The Bow and Arrow War Days on the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta of Alaska.
      - HERBERT MASCHNER AND OWEN K. MASON. The Bow and Arrow in Northern North America. 
      - NATHAN S. LOWREY. AN ETHNOARCHAEOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROJECTILE POINT AND ARMOR TECHNOLOGIES OF THE NORTHWEST COAST.
      - F. A. Golder. Primitive Warfare among the Natives of Western Alaska. 
      - Donald Mitchell. Predatory Warfare, Social Status, and the North Pacific Slave Trade. 
      - H. Kory Cooper and Gabriel J. Bowen. Metal Armor from St. Lawrence Island. 
      - Katherine L. Reedy-Maschner and Herbert D. G. Maschner. Marauding Middlemen: Western Expansion and Violent Conflict in the Subarctic.
      - Madonna L. Moss and Jon M. Erlandson. Forts, Refuge Rocks, and Defensive Sites: The Antiquity of Warfare along the North Pacific Coast of North America.
      - Owen K. Mason. Flight from the Bering Strait: Did Siberian Punuk/Thule Military Cadres Conquer Northwest Alaska?
      - Joan B. Townsend. Firearms against Native Arms: A Study in Comparative Efficiencies with an Alaskan Example. 
      - Jerry Melbye and Scott I. Fairgrieve. A Massacre and Possible Cannibalism in the Canadian Arctic: New Evidence from the Saunaktuk Site (NgTn-1).
      - McClelland A.V. The Evolution of Tlingit Daggers // Sharing Our Knowledge. The Tlingit and Their Coastal Neighbors. 2015
       
       
      - ФРЭНК СЕКОЙ. ВОЕННЫЕ НАВЫКИ ИНДЕЙЦЕВ ВЕЛИКИХ РАВНИН.
      - Hoig, Stan. Tribal Wars of the Southern Plains.
      - D. E. Worcester. Spanish Horses among the Plains Tribes.
      - DANIEL J. GELO AND LAWRENCE T. JONES III. Photographic Evidence for Southern Plains Armor.
      - Heinz W. Pyszczyk. Historic Period Metal Projectile Points and Arrows, Alberta, Canada: A Theory for Aboriginal Arrow Design on the Great Plains.
      - Waldo R. Wedel. CHAIN MAIL IN PLAINS ARCHEOLOGY.
      - Mavis Greer and John Greer. Armored Horses in Northwestern Plains Rock Art.
      - James D. Keyser, Mavis Greer and John Greer. Arminto Petroglyphs: Rock Art Damage Assessment and Management Considerations in Central Wyoming.
      - Mavis Greer and John Greer. Armored
 Horses 
in 
the 
Musselshell
 Rock 
Art
 of Central
 Montana.
      - Thomas Frank Schilz and Donald E. Worcester. The Spread of Firearms among the Indian Tribes on the Northern Frontier of New Spain.
      - Стукалин Ю. Военное дело индейцев Дикого Запада. Энциклопедия.
      - James D. Keyser and Michael A. Klassen. Plains Indian rock art.
       
       
      - D. Bruce Dickson. The Yanomamo of the Mississippi Valley? Some Reflections on Larson (1972), Gibson (1974), and Mississippian Period Warfare in the Southeastern United States.
      - Steve A. Tomka. THE ADOPTION OF THE BOW AND ARROW: A MODEL BASED ON EXPERIMENTAL PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS.
      - Wayne  William  Van  Horne. The  Warclub: Weapon  and  symbol  in  Southeastern  Indian  Societies.
      - W.  KARL  HUTCHINGS s  LORENZ  W.  BRUCHER. Spearthrower performance: ethnographic and  experimental research.
      - DOUGLAS J. KENNETT, PATRICIA M. LAMBERT, JOHN R. JOHNSON, AND BRENDAN J. CULLETON. Sociopolitical Effects of Bow and Arrow Technology in Prehistoric Coastal California.
      - The Ethics of Anthropology and Amerindian Research Reporting on Environmental Degradation and Warfare. Editors Richard J. Chacon, Rubén G. Mendoza.
      - Walter Hough. Primitive American Armor. 
      - George R. Milner. Nineteenth-Century Arrow Wounds and Perceptions of Prehistoric Warfare.
      - Patricia M. Lambert. The Archaeology of War: A North American Perspective.
      - David E. Jonesэ Native North American Armor, Shields, and Fortifications.
      - Laubin, Reginald. Laubin, Gladys. American Indian Archery.
      - Karl T. Steinen. AMBUSHES, RAIDS, AND PALISADES: MISSISSIPPIAN WARFARE IN THE INTERIOR SOUTHEAST.
      - Jon L. Gibson. Aboriginal Warfare in the Protohistoric Southeast: An Alternative Perspective. 
      - Barbara A. Purdy. Weapons, Strategies, and Tactics of the Europeans and the Indians in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Florida.
      - Charles Hudson. A Spanish-Coosa Alliance in Sixteenth-Century North Georgia.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Why the Iroquois Won: An Analysis of Iroquois Military Tactics.
      - George R. Milner. Warfare in Prehistoric and Early Historic Eastern North America // Journal of Archaeological Research, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 105-151
      - George R. Milner, Eve Anderson and Virginia G. Smith. Warfare in Late Prehistoric West-Central Illinois // American Antiquity. Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 581-603
      - Daniel K. Richter. War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience. 
      - Jeffrey P. Blick. The Iroquois practice of genocidal warfare (1534‐1787).
      - Michael S. Nassaney and Kendra Pyle. The Adoption of the Bow and Arrow in Eastern North America: A View from Central Arkansas.
      - J. Ned Woodall. MISSISSIPPIAN EXPANSION ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER: ONE STRATEGY IN THE NORTH CAROLINA PIEDMONT.
      - Roger Carpenter. Making War More Lethal: Iroquois vs. Huron in the Great Lakes Region, 1609 to 1650.
      - Craig S. Keener. An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Iroquois Assault Tactics Used against Fortified Settlements of the Northeast in the Seventeenth Century.
      - Leroy V. Eid. A Kind of : Running Fight: Indian Battlefield Tactics in the Late Eighteenth Century.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Huron vs. Iroquois: A Case Study in Inter-Tribal Warfare.
      - Jennifer Birch. Coalescence and Conflict in Iroquoian Ontario // Archaeological Review from Cambridge - 25.1 - 2010
      - William J. Hunt, Jr. Ethnicity and Firearms in the Upper Missouri Bison-Robe Trade: An Examination of Weapon Preference and Utilization at Fort Union Trading Post N.H.S., North Dakota.
      - Patrick M. Malone. Changing Military Technology Among the Indians of Southern New England, 1600-1677.
      - David H. Dye. War Paths, Peace Paths An Archaeology of Cooperation and Conflict in Native Eastern North America.
      - Wayne Van Horne. Warfare in Mississippian Chiefdoms.
      - Wayne E. Lee. The Military Revolution of Native North America: Firearms, Forts, and Polities // Empires and indigenes: intercultural alliance, imperial expansion, and warfare in the early modern world. Edited by Wayne E. Lee. 2011
      - Steven LeBlanc. Prehistoric Warfare in the American Southwest. 1999.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. A History of Research on Warfare in Anthropology // American Anthropologist. Vol. 101, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 794-805
      - Lee, Wayne. Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Culture Adaptation // The Journal of Military History, Volume 68, Number 3, July 2004, pp. 713-770
      - Wayne E. Lee. Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800 // The Journal of Military History. Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), pp. 701-741
       
      - Weapons, Weaponry and Man: In Memoriam Vytautas Kazakevičius (Archaeologia Baltica, Vol. 8). 2007
      - The Horse and Man in European Antiquity: Worldview, Burial Rites, and Military and Everyday Life (Archaeologia Baltica, Vol. 11). 2009
      - The Taking and Displaying of Human Body Parts as Trophies by Amerindians. 2007
      - The Ethics of Anthropology and Amerindian Research. Reporting on Environmental Degradation and Warfare. 2012
      - Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World. 2011
      - A. Gat. War in Human Civilization.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Killing of Captured Enemies: A Cross‐cultural Study.
      - Azar Gat. The Causes and Origins of "Primitive Warfare": Reply to Ferguson.
      - Azar Gat. The Pattern of Fighting in Simple, Small-Scale, Prestate Societies.
      - Lawrence H. Keeley. War Before Civilization: the Myth of the Peaceful Savage.
      - Keith F. Otterbein. Warfare and Its Relationship to the Origins of Agriculture.
      - Jonathan Haas. Warfare and the Evolution of Culture.
      - М. Дэйви. Эволюция войн.
      - War in the Tribal Zone Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare Edited by R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead.
      - I.J.N. Thorpe. Anthropology, Archaeology, and the Origin of Warfare.
      - Антропология насилия. Новосибирск. 2010.
      - Jean Guilaine and Jean Zammit. The origins of war: violence in prehistory. 2005. Французское издание было в 2001 году - le Sentier de la Guerre: Visages de la violence préhistorique.
      - Warfare in Bronze Age Society. 2018
      - Ian Armit. Headhunting and the Body in Iron Age Europe. 2012
      - The Cambridge World History of Violence. Vol. I-IV. 2020

    • Сеньориальные и "частные" войны.
      By hoplit
      - Justine Firnhaber-Baker. From God’s Peace to the King’s Order: Late Medieval Limitations on Non-Royal Warfare // Essays in Medieval Studies Volume 23, 2006.
      - Justine Firnhaber-Baker. Seigneurial War and Royal Power in Later Medieval Southern France // Past & Present, Vol. 208, No. 1, 2010, p. 37-76.
      - Justine Firnhaber-Baker. Techniques of seigneurial war in the fourteenth century // Journal of Medieval History 36(1): 90-103. 2010.
       - Gadi Algazi. Pruning Peasants Private War and Maintaining the Lords’ Peace in Late Medieval Germany // Medieval Transformations: Texts, Power and Gifts in Context, Esther Cohen & Mayke de Jong eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 245–274.
      -  Geary Patrick J. Vivre en conflit dans une France sans État : typologie des mécanismes de règlement des conflits (1050-1200) // Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations. 41ᵉ année, N. 5, 1986. pp. 1107-1133
       
      Также - Justine Firnhaber-Baker. Violence and the State in Languedoc, 1250-1400. 2014.
       
      Сборник статей по "приватным войнам" в домонгольском Иране - Iranian Studies, volume 38, number 4, December 2005.
      - Jürgen Paul. Introduction: Private warfare in pre-Mongol Iran.
      - Ahmed Abdelsalam. The practice of violence in the ḥisba-theories.
      - Deborah Tor. Privatized Jihad and public order in the pre-Seljuq period: The role of the Mutatawwi‘a.
      - Jürgen Paul. The Seljuq conquest(s) of Nishapur: A reappraisal.
      - David Durand-guédy. Iranians at war under Turkish domination: The example of pre-Mongol Isfahan. 
       
      Juergen Paul
      -  Juergen Paul. The State and the military: the Samanid case // Papers on hater Asia, 26. 1994
      - Juergen Paul. Armies, lords, and subjects in medieval Iran // The Cambridge World History of Violence, vol. 2. 2020
      - Juergen Paul. The State and the Military – a Nomadic Perspective // Militär und Staatlichkeit. Beiträge des Kolloquiums am 29. und 30.04.2002. 2003
      И у него же - пачка свежих интересных работ по региональной элите. К примеру:
      Juergen Paul. Who Were the Mulūk Fārs // Transregional and Regional Elites - Connecting the Early Islamic Empire. 2020
      Juergen Paul. Local Lords or Rural Notables? Some Remarks on the ra'is in Twelfth Century Eastern Iran // Medieval Central Asia and the Persianate World. Iranian Tradition and Islamic Civilisation. 2015
      Juergen Paul. Hasanwayh b. Husayn al-Kurdi: From freehold castles to vassality? // The Abbasid and Carolingian Empires. Comparative Studies in Civilizational Formation. 2017
       
    • Военное дело аборигенов Филиппинских островов.
      By hoplit
      Laura Lee Junker. Warrior burials and the nature of warfare in pre-Hispanic Philippine chiefdoms //  Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, Vol. 27, No. 1/2, SPECIAL ISSUE: NEW EXCAVATION, ANALYSIS AND PREHISTORICAL INTERPRETATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN ARCHAEOLOGY (March/June 1999), pp. 24-58.
      Jose Amiel Angeles. The Battle of Mactan and the Indegenous Discourse on War // Philippine Studies vol. 55, no. 1 (2007): 3–52.
      Victor Lieberman. Some Comparative Thoughts on Premodern Southeast Asian Warfare //  Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,  Vol. 46, No. 2, Aspects of Warfare in Premodern Southeast Asia (2003), pp. 215-225.
      Robert J. Antony. Turbulent Waters: Sea Raiding in Early Modern South East Asia // The Mariner’s Mirror 99:1 (February 2013), 23–38.
       
      Thomas M. Kiefer. Modes of Social Action in Armed Combat: Affect, Tradition and Reason in Tausug Private Warfare // Man New Series, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 586-596
      Thomas M. Kiefer. Reciprocity and Revenge in the Philippines: Some Preliminary Remarks about the Tausug of Jolo // Philippine Sociological Review. Vol. 16, No. 3/4 (JULY-OCTOBER, 1968), pp. 124-131
      Thomas M. Kiefer. Parrang Sabbil: Ritual suicide among the Tausug of Jolo // Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde. Deel 129, 1ste Afl., ANTHROPOLOGICA XV (1973), pp. 108-123
      Thomas M. Kiefer. Institutionalized Friendship and Warfare among the Tausug of Jolo // Ethnology. Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul., 1968), pp. 225-244
      Thomas M. Kiefer. Power, Politics and Guns in Jolo: The Influence of Modern Weapons on Tao-Sug Legal and Economic Institutions // Philippine Sociological Review. Vol. 15, No. 1/2, Proceedings of the Fifth Visayas-Mindanao Convention: Philippine Sociological Society May 1-2, 1967 (JANUARY-APRIL, 1967), pp. 21-29
      Armando L. Tan. Shame, Reciprocity and Revenge: Some Reflections on the Ideological Basis of Tausug Conflict // Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society. Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1981), pp. 294-300.
       
      Linda A. Newson. Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines. 2009.
      William Henry Scott. Barangay: Sixteenth-century Philippine Culture and Society. 1994.
      Laura Lee Junker. Raiding, Trading, and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms. 1999.
      Vic Hurley. Swish Of The Kris: The Story Of The Moros. 1936. 
       
      Peter Bellwood. First Islanders. Prehistory and Human Migration in Island Southeast Asia. 2017
      Peter S. Bellwood. The Austronesians. Historical and Comparative Perspectives. 2006 (1995)
      Peter Bellwood. Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago. 2007 (первое издание - 1985, переработанное издание - 1997, это второе издание переработанного издания).
      Kirch, Patrick Vinton. On the Road of the Winds. An Archaeological History of the Pacific Islands. 2017. Это второе издание, расширенное и переработанное.
    • Северо-восточная Индия.
      By hoplit
      Апатани.
      С длинными копьями. Где-то 5-6 метров?

      Щит и копьё. Чем не пельта?

      На части фото копья не такие длинные.



      А вот тут, кажется, явно разнокалиберные.

       
      The Nagas. Hill Peoples of Northeast India
    • Чеченская война
      By Сергий
      Это не домыслы досужих журналюг. Это карты боевых действий и учебные материалы военных, опубликованные в свободном доступе.